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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Three Essays on Monetary Policy
by
Xu Zhang
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California San Diego, 2019
Professor James Hamilton, Chair
This dissertation studies the identification of monetary policy and the effects of monetary
policy on the macroeconomy.
Chapter 1 provides a new methodology to identify monetary policy shock. Federal
Reserve announcements contain information about both economic fundamentals and monetary
policy. My paper proposes to disentangle the information effects using Federal Reserve’s
forecasts about the macroeconomy and constructs a new measure of monetary policy shocks.
The new shock series is consistent with the traditional view.
Chapter 2 investigates the effects of unconventional monetary policy when the nominal
interest rate reaches the zero lower bound. There are two types of monetary policy, i.e. forward
xii
guidance and large-scale asset purchases. I identify the separate contributions of each monetary
policy shock to the effects on yield curve and macroeconomy.
Chapter 3 studies the effects of monetary policy on the household behavior. I look at
how households with heterogeneous balance sheet composition would make their decisions in
response to monetary policy interventions, and to what extent and this could affect the aggregate
economy. I provide empirical analysis using household-level data, and document empirical
stylized facts that can be used to evaluate different theoretical transmission channels of monetary
policy.
xiii
Chapter 1
Disentangling the Information Effects in
the Federal Reserve’s Monetary Policy
Announcements
Abstract
Federal Reserve announcements affect private sector beliefs in two different ways, reveal-
ing information about both economic fundamentals and monetary policy. This paper separates
the information revelation from the effect of policy by combining the high-frequency multidimen-
sional approach of Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) with Greenbook measures of the Fed’s information
as in Romer and Romer (2004). The new shock series is consistent with the traditional view.
In contrast to existing measures, a contractionary shock causes an upward revision in private
forecasts of unemployment, a downward revision in private forecasts of inflation, and a decline
in stock price.
1.1 Introduction
A number of approaches have been suggested for measuring a monetary policy shock.
Kuttner (2001) use the daily change in the current month federal funds futures contract on the
day of a Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting. Gertler and Karadi (2015) use the
change in the 3-month-ahead federal funds futures contract. Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) calculated
principal components of the current and 3-month-ahead federal funds future along with 6-month,
1
9-month, and 1-year ahead Eurodollar futures. Romer and Romer (2004) use the change in the
Fed’s intended target that could not be predicted on the basis of the Fed’s Greenbook forecasts
of inflation, GDP, and unemployment. Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2018) use the component
of the change in the 3-month-ahead fed funds futures in a 30-minute window around FOMC
announcements that could not be predicted using Greenbook forecasts.
In this paper I present evidence that none of these measures completely corrects for
the Fed information effect. The first four measures are all statistically significantly negative
on average during NBER recessions. The Fed was surprising the market by lowering rates at
these times in response to weak economic fundamentals that the Fed recognized but the market
did not. This means that existing measures are conflating the effects of monetary policy, the
effects of information revelation, and the effects of the recession itself. I extend the analysis of
Campbell et al. (2012) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) to find that revisions to the Blue
Chip consensus forecasts of unemployment typically fall after a contractionary monetary policy
shock according to all of the measures except for Romer and Romer, the opposite response from
that predicted for a true contractionary monetary shock, and a response suggesting that revelation
of the Fed’s information about economic fundamentals is likely an important component of
what is treated as a shock to monetary policy. I extend the analysis of Cieslak and Schrimpf
(2018) and Jarocin´ski and Karadi (2018), finding that about half the time, stock prices rise at
the time of a contractionary monetary policy shock according to the Kutter, Gertler-Karadi, or
Romer-Romer measures. Finally, the federal funds rate, current month feral funds futures rate
and the 3-month-ahead fed funds futures rate exhibited essentially no variation over 2009 to
2014, meaning that the Kuttner, Gertler-Karadi, Romer-Romer, and Miranda-Agrippino-Ricco
measures do not exist for this important subsample. It will create bias when calculating the
principal components in the extended sample.
I develop a new measure that solves all of these problems, combining the multidimen-
sional aspect of monetary policy information noted by Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) with the use of
Greenbook forecasts by Romer and Romer (2004) and Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2018)
2
and exploiting the basic insight of using high-frequency observations for identification that is
common to all of the above measures. I use separate regressions to isolate the component of
the change on the day of an FOMC announcement of each of the five different fed funds and
Eurodollar futures that could not have been predicted on the basis of Greenbook forecasts. I
next calculate the principal component of this vector using an unbalanced panel approach that
takes into account the lack of variability of the shorter horizon contracts during 2009-2014. In
contrast to the other five measures, this measure is actually slightly positive on average (though
far from statistically significant) during NBER recessions. It is the only measure for which
revisions to the Blue Chip forecasts of both inflation and unemployment tend to change in the
direction predicted for a monetary expansion or contraction. And about 2/3 of the time, stock
and bond prices move together in the way predicted by theory. I use the new measure to revisit
the structural vector autoregression of Gertler and Karadi (2015) and find that the new measure
eliminates both the “price puzzle” and the “output puzzle” (responses to a monetary shock of
the opposite sign predicted by theory) that is sometimes found using other measures. Given the
5-year delay in releasing Greenbook forecasts, the most recent value for the new measure is
2013:m12, though this still extends the usable sample by at least 4 years beyond that available
for the Kuttner, Gertler-Karadi, Romer-Romer, or Miranda-Agrippino-Ricco measures.
This paper contributes to several important literatures. First, it adds to the monetary
policy identification literature. This includes the VAR studies such as Christiano et al. (1999)
and also the work of Romer and Romer (2004). More recent studies provide lots of evidence
that monetary policy news is multi-dimensional. For example, Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) construct
a “current federal funds rate target” factor and a “future path of policy” factor. Campbell et al.
(2012) distinguish between Delphic and Odyssean monetary policy, where the Delphic type
publicly states central banks’ macroeconomic performance forecast whereas the Odyssean type
publicly commits the policymaker’s future action. To separate the non-information movement,
Campbell et al. (2012) estimate a monetary policy rule with anticipated shocks. Nakamura and
Steinsson (2018) model Fed’s information as beliefs about the path of the “natural rate of interest”
3
and estimate the structural model using real rates. To disentangle the two components, I provide
a method that combines the high-frequency approach of Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) and Romer and
Romer (2004)’s narrative approach. It is easy to implement and survives the prevailing tests in
the literature.
My paper also contributes to the literature regarding the assessment of the effects of the
unconventional monetary policies. Many of the world’s largest economies have experienced the
zero short-term nominal interest rate over the last decade. It’s hard to find a measure for monetary
policy surprises during this period. In addition, as Hamilton (2018) documents, like conventional
monetary policy announcement, the Fed’s unconventional monetary policy announcements also
contain Fed’s assessment of economic fundamentals. Since I use longer term federal funds
futures to construct the measure, it survives the zero lower bound period.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. I review the literature on the monetary
policy identification in Section 1.2. In section 1.3, I describe the procedure to construct the
monetary policy shock. Section 1.4 describes the effects of monetary policy using the new
measure and applies the new measure to previous studies. Section 3.4 concludes.
1.2 Existing approaches and the problem
A number of studies have proposed alternative methods to measure a monetary policy
shock. In this section I will review the five existing approaches and evaluate their performance.
Surprise in the federal funds rate target (MP1). The high-frequency identification
approach was pioneered by Kuttner (2001). Under the identifying assumption that no other
shocks affect the expectation for federal funds rate around the 30-minute window of FOMC
announcement, the surprise in the target rate is measured as the daily change in the spot-month
federal funds future rate (FF1), scaled up to reflect the number of days affected by the change.
This monetary policy shock is called MP1 in the literature.
To compare the size among different measure of monetary policy shocks, I rescale MP1
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(and will do the same for all the other measures presented below) such that its effect on the daily
two-year nominal Treasury yield is equal to 100 basis points.1
To convert the shock series into monthly frequency, I assign each shock to the month in
which the corresponding FOMC announcements are made. If there are two meetings in a month,
I sum the shocks. If there are no meetings in a month, I record the shock as zero for that month.
Monetary surprises are supposed to capture only unanticipated movements in interest
rates. However, the mean of the MP1 series is nonzero, and it is serially correlated. After 2008,
the MP1 didn’t vary much and was almost zero between 2009 and 2014. For this reason, I restrict
the sample period of MP1 to be between 1990:1m and 2008:12m.
In the upper left panel of Figure 1.1, I plot the cumulative change in MP1 over a 12-month
period using just the days of FOMC announcements. The shaded areas represent NBER-defined
recessions for the U.S. economy. The Fed was surprising the market with lower interest rates
during the recessions, and it was doing this because it saw the economy as weaker than many
private analysts recognized at the time. To quantify this observation, I regress the monetary
policy surprises on the NBER recession indicator and look at the regression coefficient. The
regression equation is
MPSt = βRecessiont+ εt (1.1)
where MPSt is the monetary policy surprise in month t. In the case of Kuttner (2001),
it is represented by the MP1t . Recessiont is a binary variable equal to 1 if the the month t is a
NBER recession month and equal to zero otherwise.
As shown in Table 1.1, the estimated β is -2.66 and is statistically significant at the
1% level. If one uses the MP1 to study the correlation between monetary shock and economic
variables of interest, it will in part reflect the effect of the recession, not the effect of actions by
1The daily zero-coupon nominal Treasury yields are obtained from Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2007) dataset. Swanson
and Williams (2014) provide evidence that the zero lower bound was not a constraint on the Federal Reserve’s
ability to manipulate the two-year Treasury yield.
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the Fed.
Next I look at whether the measure of MP1 includes an information effect. I follow
Campbell et al. (2012) and estimate the responses of revisions of inflation and unemployment
rate forecasts to the proposed monetary policy measure. The regression equation is
4yht+1 = βhMPSt+ εt+1 (1.2)
where4yht+1 is the revision of the h-quarter-ahead Blue Chip consensus forecast of inflation and
unemployment rate at the beginning of month t+1, and h= 0,1,2,3,4.
Table 1.2 presents the regression result.2 In theory, a true contractionary monetary policy
shock should increase unemployment rate expectation and decrease the inflation expectation.
However, most coefficients in column 1 show the opposite direction. The interpretation is
that part of what happens is the Fed raises the interest rate because it sees fundamentals as
stronger, and the private forecasts respond to the signal by being more optimistic about the the
fundamentals.
Cieslak and Schrimpf (2018) and Jarocin´ski and Karadi (2018) look at the problem from
the perspective of the comovement of S&P 500 with bond yields. Again, a true contractionary
monetary policy shock should raise interest rates and depress output, both of which should lower
stock prices. A contractionary monetary policy shock again seems to be interpreted by private
forecasters as expansionary. However, as Table 3 shows, on 51% of all the announcement days
do MP1 and the intraday change in S&P 500 co-move in the “correct” direction. This number
decreases to 45% if we use the daily change in S&P 500.
Change in 3-month ahead Federal funds futures (4FF4). Gertler and Karadi (2015)
use the three month ahead funds rate future surprise (4FF4) around the 30-minute of Fed’s
2Blue Chip Economic Indicator survey is conducted between the 2nd and the 7th day of each month. The
monetary surprise data I use for this regression is restricted to include only the announcements made after the first
week of the calendar month. The result is robust if I use the observations where the entire month’s announcements
are made after the first week of the calendar month.
6
announcement to identify monetary policy shock.
I plot the 12-month backward-rolling window cumulative change in the first row second
column of Figure 1.1. 4FF4 didn’t vary considerably and was almost zero between 2009 and
2013, which will make it impossible to use as an instrument during the Great Recession period.
The sample period is 1990:1m-2008:12m.
From the figure as well as Table 1.1, we see that 4FF4 is more likely to be negative
during the NEBR recession months. Column 2 of Table 1.2 presents the regression result of
equation 1.2 with the monetary policy surprise MPS measured by4FF4. Still, the contractionary
monetary policy looks like expansionary one. Table 1.3 shows that MP1 and the intraday change
in S&P 500 move together as predicted on only 52% of announcement days. This number falls
to 48% if we use the daily change in S&P 500.
Instrument set of futures (MP1, MP2, 4ED2, 4ED3, 4ED4). Gu¨rkaynak et al.
(2005) find that the FOMC statements affect the financial market through current policy action
along with influence on the market expectations of future policy actions. They suggest to use
mixed horizons of futures data to measure the response of market expectations. I follow the
literature and use the following instrument set: the surprises in the current month’s fed funds
futures with a scale factor to account for the timing of FOMC meetings within the month (MP1),
in the three-month ahead monthly fed funds futures (also scaled, known as MP2), and in the
six-month, nine-month and year ahead futures on three month Eurodollar deposits (ED2, ED3,
ED4) on the days of FOMC announcement.
The sample period in Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) is from 1990:1m to 2004:12m, and
Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) use the sample period 1995:1m - 2014:3m. I use the extended
sample period 1990:1m -2018:12m, take the first principal component of the balanced panel, and
rescale it such that the effect on the two-year nominal Treasury yield is equal to 100 basis points.
This shock is called PC1.
One problem of applying Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005)’s principal components idea to longer
samples is that short term federal funds futures, and thus the MP1 and MP2 were unresponsive
7
during the Great Recession. Taking the principal component of the balanced sample will generate
bias, especially for the recession period. In middle panel of Figure 1.1, I compare the PC1 with a
modified PC1 which is calculated using the expectation maximum (EM) algorithm developed in
Stock and Watson (2002) where MP1 and MP2 are treated as missing during the recession.
Let’s take look at the performance of the PC1. Again, the coefficient in Table 1.1 indicates
the PC1 is more likely to be negative during the recession. And if I use the modified PC1, the
result still holds. The coefficients in Column 3 of Table 1.2 are usually the opposite of what
they should be. Table 1.3 shows PC1 and the intraday change in S&P 500 move together as
predicted on 71% of announcement days. The results won’t change much if using the modified
PC1 because these analysis is conducted for the sample period 1990:m1 - 2007:m12.
The Romer-Romer (RR) shock. The seminal empirical paper on Fed information is
Romer and Romer (2004). They construct their monetary policy shocks by combining the
narrative approach with the Greenbook forecasts.3 They derive the intended federal funds rate
changes during FOMC meetings using narrative methods. In order to separate the endogenous
response of policy to information about the economy from the exogenous policy deviation, they
then regress the intended funds rate change on the current rate and on the Greenbook forecasts
of output growth and inflation over the next two quarters. The specific equation they estimate in
the second step is as follows.4
4fftm = β0fft levelm−+
2
∑
j=−1
β4INFLj 4INFLGBm,q+ j+
2
∑
j=−1
β4RealGDPj 4RealGDPGBm,q+ j
+
2
∑
j=−1
β INFLj INFL
GB
m,q+ j+
2
∑
j=−1
βRealGDPj RealGDP
GB
m,q+ j+β
UNEMPUNEMPm,q
+ constant+ εm
3Wieland and Yang (2016) extend their shock series to the end of 2007.
4This is the equation 1 in Romer and Romer (2004).
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where4fftm denotes the change in the federal funds target on the FOMC meeting m, and
fft levelm− is the level of the federal funds rate before any changes associated with the meeting,
which is included to capture any tendency toward mean reversion in FOMC behavior. Let q
be the quarter where the meeting m takes place. INFLGBm,q+ j, RealGDP
GB
m,q+ j and RealGDP
GB
m,q+ j
denote the Greenbook forecasts for inflation, real GDP and unemployment rate for quarter q+ j
made at meeting m, j=-1,0,1, 2, respectively. 4INFLGBm,q+ j and4RealGDPGBm,q+ j is the revised
forecast for inflation and real GDP growth between two consecutive meetings. In computing
the forecast innovations, the forecast horizons for meetings m and m-1 are adjusted so that the
forecasts refer to the same quarter.
The Romer-Romer shock starts from 1969 and ends on 2007 due to the zero lower bound.
Their meeting dates are very different from Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005), especially for the pre-1994
period. The FOMC did not explicitly announce changes in its target for the federal funds rate,
but such changes were implicitly communicated to financial markets through the size and type of
the following open market operation, which is used as announcement dates in Gu¨rkaynak et al.
(2005).
Table 1.2 column 4 shows the responses of Blue Chip forecast revisions for inflation
and unemployment rate to Romer-Romer shock. In some cases, contractionary monetary policy
seems to increase the inflation expectation, which is not true according to theory. The stock price
co-movements analysis in Table 1.3 shows Romer-Romer shock and the intraday change in S&P
500 move together as predicted on only 46% of announcement days.
The MAR shock. Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2018) regress the 30-minute window
surprise in FF4 onto the Greenbook forecasts and uses the residual to construct the monetary
policy shock. First they estimate the following regression.
9
4FF4d =
2
∑
j=−1
β4INFLj 4INFLINFLGBd,q+ j+
2
∑
j=−1
β4RealGDPj 4RealGDPGBd,q+ j
+
3
∑
j=−1
β INFLj INFL
GB
d,q+ j+
3
∑
j=−1
βRealGDPj RealGDP
GB
d,q+ j+β
UNEMPUNEMPGBd,q
+ constant+ εd
Next they construct a monthly instrument by summing the regression residuals within
each month. Then they regress the non-zero monthly aggregation onto its 12 lags, and the
residual is the MAR monetary policy shock.
The three-month ahed federal funds futures is only available after 1990 and is not
responsive during the zero lower bound. Therefore the MAR series is begins 1991:m1 and ends
2009:m12.
The coefficient in Table 1.1 indicates the MAR shock is more likely to be negative during
the recession, though insignificant. Table 1.2 column 5 presents the responses of Blue chip ex-
pectation revisions for unemployment rate and inflation to contractionary MAR monetary policy
shock.5 Almost all the coefficients are insignificant from zero, and all the unemployment rate
revision responses go into the opposite direction as predicted by theory. Table 1.3 shows MAR
shock and the intraday change in S&P 500 move together as predicted on 64% of announcement
days.
In summary, all the measures of monetary policy shocks mentioned above still seem
to have an important signaling component. They tend on average to be pro-cyclical, as if the
fed was lowering rates during recessions for some reason other than a response to perceived
economic conditions.
5The meeting frequency measure is used.
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1.3 Construction of the new measure
There are two components of the responses of interest rates to the FOMC announcement.
One relates to the FOMC’s monetary policy actions based on the policymaker’s potentially supe-
rior information about economic fundamentals. Another one is the policymaker’s commitment
to the current and future monetary policy.6 In the rest of this section, I lay out a new procedure
to construct monetary policy shocks that isolates the second component from the information
effects. I proceed in the following five steps.
Step 1, following Kuttner (2001) and Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005), I build the unanticipated
change over the 30-minute windows in the following five interest rates7: the current month’s fed
funds target rate (MP1)8, the three month ahead monthly fed funds futures (FF4), and the six
month, nine month and year ahead futures on three month Eurodollar deposits (ED2, ED3, ED4).
Since there’s little variation for the shorter horizon interest rate futures in the zero lower
bound period, the sample length for these data is reduced. For MP1 and FF4, the sample period
is 1990:m1- 2008:m12. However, the longer horizon futures, like ED2, ED3 and ED4, still
respond to the monetary announcement. The sample periods are 1988:m1- 2012:m12, 1988:m1-
2012:m12, 1988:m1- 2013:m12, respectively.
Step 2, I regress these surprises, MP1,4FF4,4ED2,4ED3,4ED4 onto (i) the level
of the futures’s interest rate one day before to capture mean reversion in FOMC behavior, (ii)
two lags in previous meetings, to control for the autocorrelation, (iii) Greenbook forecasts and
6Campbell et al. (2012) defines the former one as Delphic monetary policy and the latter one as Odyssean
monetary policy.
7The intraday data for the futures and the meeting dates is obtained from the Federal Reserve Board.
8Different from the original construction method in Kuttner (2001), when the FOMC meeting occurs on a day
when there are 7 days or less remaining in a month, I instead use the change in the price of next month’s fed funds
futures contract. This avoids multiplying the change by a very large factor. Let FF1 be the interest rate of the current
month fed funds futures and FF2 be the interest rate of the next month fed funds futures. The announcement is
made on day d, which is the tth of the month, and the calendar month has T days in total. The surprise in the federal
funds rate target MP1 is defined as
MP1d =

FF2d−FF1d−1 if t = 1
(FF1d−FF1d−1) TT−t if 1 < t < T−7
FF2d−FF2d−1 if t >= T−7
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forecast revisions for real output growth, inflation and the unemployment rate, as in Romer and
Romer (2004), to control for the central bank’s private information. The specific equation I
estimate is:
MPSd = β0MPS leveld−+β1MPSd−1+β2MPSd−2
+
s
∑
j=−1
β4INFLj 4INFLGBd,q+ j+
s
∑
j=−1
β4RealGDPj 4RealGDPGBd,q+ j
+
s
∑
j=−1
β INFLj INFL
GB
d,q+ j+
s
∑
j=−1
βRealGDPj RealGDP
GB
d,q+ j+
m
∑
l=0
βUNEMPj UNEMP
GB
d,q+ j
+ constant+ εd (1.3)
where MPSd denotes the market-based monetary policy surprise that on the FOMC
announcements day d. q is the quarter where the announcement takes place. The j subscripts
refer to the horizon of the real GDP and inflation forecast: -1 is the previous quarter; 0 is
the current quarter; and 1, 2, 3, ..., s are one, two, three, ..., s quarters ahead, respectively.
Because these interest rate futures represent expectation of future federal funds rate for different
horizon, I use different forecast horizon s as well. In particular, up to 2 quarters ahead, i.e.
s=2, for MP1,4FF4 and4ED2, up to 3 quarters ahead for4ED3, up to 4 quarters ahead for
4ED4. Following Romer and Romer (2004), because of the strong Okun’s Law relationship
between output growth and unemployment only the contemporaneous unemployment forecast is
controlled for MP1,4FF4 and4ED2, up to 1 quarter ahead for4ED3, and up to 2 quarters
ahead for4ED4.
Step 3, I normalize the residuals of each regression to have zero mean and unit variance,
similar to the procedure in Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005).
The different sample periods for the interest rate futures result in different sample periods
for the different residuals. I therefore use the expectation maximum (EM) algorithm developed
in Stock and Watson (2002) to calculate the principal components of the unbalanced panel of
residuals. The first principal component which explains 77.5% of the variation.
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Step 4, I rescale the first principal component such that the effect on the daily two-year
nominal Treasury yield is equal to 100 basis points. This is the the new monetary policy shock
series at the announcement frequency.
Step 5, to obtain monthly frequency, I assign each shock to the month in which the
corresponding FOMC announcement occurred. If there are two announcement days in a month,
I sum the shocks. If there are no meetings in a month, I record the shock as zero for that month.
The last figure in Figure 1.1 plots the 12-month cumulative new measure. The use of the
longer horizon eurodollar futures allows the new measure to spans from 1988:m1 to 2013:12m.
The NBER recession regression coefficient is 0.15 and insignificant shown in Table 1.1.
1.4 Effects of the monetary policy surprise
In this section, I use the new measure to estimate the effects of the monetary policy on
the macroeconomic variables and their forecasts.
1.4.1 Response of private sector forecast
Table 1.2 columns 6 and 7 show the estimated private forecast responses to the new
measure. Following a contractionary monetary policy news shock, the current and expected
unemployment rate tend to increase, and the current and expected inflation rate tend to fall. Thus,
the contractionary monetary policy shock behaves as predicted.
1.4.2 Comovement of stock price and monetary policy surprise
As shown in Table 1.3, 69% of all the announcement days the new measure and the
intraday change in S&P 500 co-moves in the opposite direction, and this number becomes 60%
if we use the daily change in S&P 500.
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1.4.3 Application in a proxy SVAR framework
In this section, I apply the new measure of monetary policy surprises to the proxy
structural VAR specification of Gertler and Karadi (2015). It is a 12-lag monthly VAR using the
monetary policy surprises as external instrument. Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2018) extend
the framework to six variables: the log of industrial production, the unemployment rate, the log
of the CPI, the log of a commodity price index, excess bond premium, and one-year government
bond yield. The sample period starts from 1979:m1 and ends on 2016:m8 due to the availability
of excess bond premium data.
Before the estimation, I test the relevance condition required for identification using
the F-statistic provided by Montiel Olea et al. (2018). It provides an indication of possible
weak-instrument concerns for inference, with the 5% critical value of 3.84. The F-statistics are
3.93, 5.49, 4.08, 1.54, 3.68 and 2.89 when we instrument the monetary policy shock using the
new measure, PC1, Romer-Romer, MP1,4FF4 and MAR, respectively. Thus we conclude that
the new measure, PC1, and Romer-Romer are relevant instruments, but do not reject the null
hypothesis of instrument irrelevance for MP1,4FF4 and MAR.
Figure 1.2 plots the impulse responses a monetary policy shock that on impact raises the
one-year government bond yield by 25 basis points using the new measure, PC1 and Romer-
Romer(RR) shock. The 90% confidence interval is constructed using the inference approach in
Montiel Olea et al. (2018) for weak instrument.
Using the new measure, the estimates imply that a shock that raises the bond yield is
contractionary: price level, commodity price level, industrial production drop immediately,
excess bond premium and the unemployment rate increase. However, if we use the PC1, the
effects on industrial production and unemployment rate never become significant, and the initial
response of unemployment rate goes in the wrong direction; if we use Romer-Romer shock, the
initial responses of both industrial production and the unemployment rate are inconsistent with
the theory.
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1.5 Conclusion
Evaluating the effects of monetary policy is important for both policy makers and
researchers. In this paper, I provide a new method of constructing monetary policy shocks
that can be used for monetary policy evaluation and compare it with the existing approaches.
The new measure successfully isolates the non-information movement of the Federal Reserve’s
announcement, whereas the previous methods are incapable to achieve. The new measure
is consistent with the standard theory’s prediction: monetary policy shock is independent of
recession period; a pure monetary policy tightening lowers private investors’ expectations about
inflation and output growth; the majority of the comovement between S&P 500 futures and
monetary policy shocks is negative. Furthermore, the new measure can be used as a relevant
instrument for IV-SVAR analysis. “Price puzzle” and “Output puzzle” disappear in the analysis.
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Figure 1.1. 12-month Backward Rolling Window of Cumulative Monetary Shocks
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Figure 1.2. Impulse Responses Using the New Measure, PC1 and Romer-Romer
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Table 1.3. % of Days Where S&P 500 Moves in the Opposite Direction with Monetary Policy
Shocks
Stock Market Index MP1 4FF4 PC1 RR MAR New New (full sample)
S&P 500 30-minute 51% 52% 71% 46% 64% 69% 68%
S&P 500 daily 45% 48% 57% 51% 56% 60% 58%
NOTES: This table displays % of days where S&P 500 moves in the opposite direction
with non-zero monetary policy shocks. The sample period for the first six columns is from
1990:m1 to 2007:m12. The last column is from 1988:m1 to 2013:m12.
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Chapter 2
Evaluating the Effects of Forward Guid-
ance and Large-scale Asset Purchases
Abstract
This paper evaluates the effects of forward guidance and large-scale asset purchases
(LSAP) when the nominal interest rate reaches the zero lower bound. I investigate the effects
of the two policies in a dynamic new Keynesian model with financial frictions adapted from
Gertler and Karadi (2011, 2013), with changes implemented so that the framework delivers
realistic predictions for the effects of each policy on the entire yield curve. I then match the
change that the model predicts would arise from a linear combination of the two shocks with
the observed change in the yield curve in a high-frequency window around Federal Reserve
announcements, allowing me to identify the separate contributions of each shock to the effects
of the announcement. My estimates correspond closely to narrative elements of the FOMC
announcements. My estimates imply that forward guidance was more important in influencing
inflation, while LSAP was more important in influencing output.
2.1 Introduction
Between December 2008 and December 2015, the federal funds rate - that is, the
conventional monetary policy instrument of the Federal Reserve, or the Fed - consistently
hovered near the zero lower bound (ZLB). To provide a much-needed stimulus to the economy,
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the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) resorted to two unconventional monetary policies
at once: forward guidance and large-scale asset purchases (LSAP).1 In this paper, I propose
a new method of separating the components of forward guidance and LSAP for each FOMC
announcement, reconciling the various interest rates’ responses predicted from a structural model
with observed high frequency yield curve data. In a follow-up step, I aggregate the effects from
each type of monetary policy and provide quantitative estimates of the influence of each FOMC
announcement on the financial market and the real economy.
The top reason for separating forward guidance from LSAP is that they affect the financial
market and macroeconomy via different channels. When the Fed provides forward guidance - that
is, communicating to the public about the likely future course of monetary policy - individuals
and businesses will use this information in making decisions about spending and investments.2
When the Fed purchases longer-term securities issued by the U.S. government and longer-term
securities issued or guaranteed by government-sponsored agencies, long-term interest rates
decline as risk premiums drop, which ultimately reduces the cost of borrowing for the private
sector.3 To better understand the efficacy of the policies and accurately estimate their effects,
however, we first need to quantify the importance of each type of monetary policy.
In this paper, I contribute to monetary policy evaluation literature in three ways: (i) by
providing a micro-foundation of how various interest rates respond to different unconventional
monetary policies, (ii) by quantifying the responses of financial markets and the real economy,
1For example, on December 16, 2008, the FOMC lowered the target for the federal funds rate to a range from 0
to 1/4 percent and indicated that it expected the target to remain there “for some time”. In the same announcement,
the Fed announced that it would continue to consider ways of using its balance sheet to further support credit
markets and economic activity.
2Eggertsson et al. (2003) show that lowering the expected path of policy rates can be highly effective in increasing
economic activity and inflation for an economy at the zero lower bound. There is a rapidly growing literature on
assessing the effect of forward guidance that has been used during the Great Recession. Important contributions
include Campbell et al. (2012), Swanson and Williams (2014), Gertler and Karadi (2015), Del Negro et al. (2015),
Keen et al. (2016) and Swanson (2017).
3Chen et al. (2012) augment a standard DSGE model with segmented bond markets, and Gertler and Karadi
(2011, 2013) provide a framework where limits to arbitrage exist. Most empirical research has focused on analyzing
the effects of LSAP on interest rates, output, inflation, term and risk in financial markets, and spillover effects in
other countries. For example, Gagnon et al. (2011), Krishnamurthy et al. (2011), Gilchrist and Zakrajsˇek (2013),
Bauer and Rudebusch (2014). Studies using a variety of methodologies generally agree that LSAP has been effective
at lowering long-term interest rates and stimulating economic growth.
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and (iii) by examining which type of unconventional monetary policy can more thoroughly
explain those responses. To those ends, I develop a model that accounts for different channels
of transmitting unconventional monetary policies and perform an empirical analysis using
high-frequency interest rate data.
I begin by building a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model based on the work of Gertler and Karadi (2011, 2013). I introduce a nominal short-term
shadow interest rate that I assume follows a Taylor rule, as well as a forward guidance shock is
the form of an announcement of future shocks to the interest rate rule, following the modeling
device for generating innovations in expected future interest rates proposed by Lase´en and
Svensson (2011). I allow a ZLB where a one-period nominal interest rate endogenously remains
when the economy enters a recession. Also following Gertler and Karadi (2011, 2013), I model
LSAP as the central bank’s purchase of a perpetuity, which affects the economy to the extent
that limits to arbitrage in private intermediation exist.
Next, I perform some model simulations in which the economy endogenously remains at
the ZLB for a few periods as a result of a negative shock. I also suppose that either a forward
guidance policy or an LSAP program involving the purchase of long-term securities is initiated
in the wake of the shock. I obtain the different impulse responses of short-term shadow and
perpetuity interest rates to each type of monetary policy.
The mechanisms by which the forward guidance and LSAP affect the shadow rate and the
perpetuity rate differently are as follows. I assume that the central bank has limited commitment
power and influences people’s expectations up to a finite horizon. That assumption is realistic
insofar as the central bank wants to be flexible and adjust its monetary policy as economic
conditions change. Instead of setting up an infinite horizon interest rate path now and changing
it later, which will hurt its credibility, the central bank provides guidance for a short period. As a
result, when the Fed exercises the forward guidance policy, the shadow interest drops below the
perpetuity interest rate. When the Fed makes asset purchases, on the one hand it will increase
the demand for the perpetuity interest rate and lower the long-term interest rate; on the other, it
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will increase people’s expectations for short-term output and inflation, which will increase the
shadow interest rate by way of the interest rate rule.
However, the daily change in the shadow rate cannot be observed in the data. To compare
the model’s prediction with interest rate data, I thus interpolate the entire yield curve by using
a two-factor yield curve interpolation method adapted from Wu and Xia (2016). As a result,
forward guidance affects Treasury yields at all maturities, with a peak effect at a maturity of
about 20 months. By contrast, the effects of LSAP increase along with maturity, meaning that
LSAP exerts its peak effect on the longest-term maturities but increases short-term maturities.
One of the implications of using a formal model of LSAP such as the one developed
here is that expansionary LSAP, by lowering long-term rates, stimulates the economy and helps
achieve higher inflation and output at the intermediate run horizon. If the Fed in the future were
to respond to the higher inflation and output with its usual Taylor rule, the result would be sooner
lift-off from the zero lower bound and a higher path for short-term interest rates. The model
predicts that LSAP would lower long-term interest rates but raise intermediate-term interest rates.
If the Fed does not want to have this effect, it should always use expansionary forward guidance
as a complementary tool in conjunction with LSAP. Our empirical estimates imply that this is
typically what the Fed in fact did.
Next I combine the theoretical result with data to identify the sizes of forward guidance
and LSAP for each Fed’s announcement. The data I use is the movements of Treasury yields at
various horizons in a daily window that brackets the Fed’s announcement. Three forces drive
those movements: the Fed’s superior information about economic conditions, the unexpected
forward guidance policy, and the unexpected asset purchases policy. To isolate the latter two
from the Fed’s information, I use Zhang (2018)’s method and regress the observed changes of
yields at each maturity on the Green Book forecasts. The residuals are orthogonal to the Fed’s
information and represent the monetary policy component of the Fed’s announcements. Then I
match the change that the structural model predicts from a linear combination of the two types
of shocks with this monetary policy component. Figure 2.1 shows the estimated size of each
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type of monetary policy on each of the Fed’s announcement days.
With the size of the policy shock at each date identified, I use the structural model to
make inferences about the other variables of interest. Overall, my estimates indicate that the
QE I program (i.e., from November 2008 to March 2010) increased two quarters ahead of real
GDP by 1.11% and two quarters ahead of expected inflation by 0.81 annualized percentage
points. Forward guidance thus exerts a greater influence on inflation expectations (0.60 vs. 0.21
annualized percentage points), whereas LSAP is more important in influencing output (0.39 vs.
0.72 percent).
This paper contributes to four major strands of literature on monetary policy evaluation.
First, among economists who have increasingly emphasized the multidimensionality of monetary
policy, Campbell et al. (2012) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) have found that the Fed’s
announcements contain information about economic conditions. However, to the best of my
knowledge, only Swanson (2017), who mobilized principal component representations of various
interest rates, has separated the effects of forward guidance and LSAP for each of the Fed’s
announcements. My paper differs from Swanson’s (2017) work in three aspects. (i) I decompose
the movement in various interest rates into information effects and monetary policy effects,
the latter of which I decompose into forward guidance and LSAP. Crucially, that separation
directs my estimates to show that much of the movement in interest rates results from the Fed’s
information; without that distinction, by contrast, the overall effects on real GDP are three times
larger. (ii) My paper provides a micro-foundation of the different effects of forward guidance
and LSAP on the yield curve. (iii) My method can allow practitioners and researchers to forecast
the long-term effects on real activity by using a structural model; otherwise, by using time series
approach, such forecasting is quite difficult to achieve, because the sample period for ZLB only
lasted for 7 years.
The second strand of literature to which my paper contributes is the use of event studies
such as Gagnon et al. (2011), Krishnamurthy et al. (2011), for instance - to assess the effects of
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four unconventional monetary policies on interest rates.4 Instead of using text analysis to discern
changes in words and sentences in current FOMC statements compared to previous statements
or whether the event date belongs to a certain period of policy implementation, I allow the data
indicate the direction and size of monetary policy. Using this approach can capture anything the
Fed does or fails to do that affects the market. For example, if the Fed chose not to take some
action or not to make a change in wording that the market anticipated5, that absence of action
can also be interpreted as revealing new information about monetary policy to the market.
Third, my paper provides a micro-foundation for identifying assumptions made in
empirical studies. Gertler and Karadi (2015), for instance, have used external instruments in a
vector autoregression (VAR) to identify monetary policy shocks and 1- and 2-year Treasury bond
yields as conceptually preferred policy indicators to study the mechanism of the transmission of
forward guidance. Earlier, Chung et al. (2012) estimated a structural model that assumes that the
term premium of long-term Treasury bonds is inversely proportional to the Fed’s holdings of
long-term securities. The following year, Baumeister and Benati (2013) employed a time-varying
parameter structural VAR model under the assumption that LSAP lowers the long-term yield
spread while short-term interest rates remain unchanged.
Fourth and last, my paper draws from empirical studies on channels used to signal the
Fed’s bond purchases. Previously, scholars such as Bauer and Rudebusch (2014) found that such
purchases have important signaling effects that lower expected future short-term interest rates by
using an event study. My paper provides a theoretical explanation for their finding6: a LSAP
announcement that causes output and inflation to rise today implies higher interest rates today,
4Wright (2012) uses a structural VAR to identify the effects of monetary policy shocks on various long-term
interest rates. The VAR is identified using the assumption that monetary policy shocks are heteroskedastic: monetary
policy shocks have higher variance on days of FOMC meetings and certain speeches than the other days.
5For example, on January 28, 2009, the FOMC statement was interpreted by some market participants as
disappointing because of its lack of concrete language regarding the possibility and timing of purchases of longer-
term Treasuries in the secondary market contrary to the other announcements Gilchrist and Zakrajsˇek (2013); Bauer
and Rudebusch (2014). As another example, on September 18, 2013, the FOMC was widely expected to begin
tapering its asset purchase while it turned out not to do so.
6Bhattarai et al. (2015) build a signaling theory where QE is effective because it generates a credible signal of
low future real interest rates in a time consistent equilibrium.
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particularly via the endogenous component in the central bank’s policy rule. Therefore, to keep
short-term rates at a low level, an additional expansionary policy should be implemented.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, I begin by describing
the model, which I calibrate in Section 2.3 to match the key features of the data, as well as
calculate the state-dependent impulse responses in different scenarios. In Section 2.4, I describe
the shadow interest rate framework used, after which I describe the regression methodology
and results in Section 2.5. In Section 2.6, I discusses the key announcement days, and I explain
the robustness of my methodology in Section 2.7. Last, I close the paper in Section 3.4 by
summarizing the findings.
2.2 A Structural Model
My framework is based on the model of Gertler and Karadi (2011, 2013). They modify a
reasonably standard New Keynesian model to explicitly include financial market structure and
financial balance sheets. The model makes three primary assumptions. Banks finance risky,
long-term assets with riskless, short-term debt. The existence of an agency problem between
households and banks constrains the borrowing ability of the latter and generates excess return
between long- and short-term debts. The central bank provides mediation for long-term asset
purchases during economic crises and boosts the economy by reducing the credit costs of the
banking sector.
I add the following features to their model. First, I introduce a nominal short-term shadow
interest rate that I assume follows a Taylor rule subject to the ZLB. The shadow interest rate is
the short-term rate when the ZLB is not binding. The shadow rate is negative when the ZLB is
binding. A larger negative value implies a longer period of time before the shadow rate becomes
positive and there is a lift-off from the ZLB. Downward shocks to the shadow rate can thus be
used as a way to represent forward guidance in the ZLB. Instead of assuming that the one-period
nominal interest rate is pegged for a certain length of time as in Gertler and Karadi, in my model
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the length of time that the economy stays at the ZLB is an endogenous response to the interaction
between forward guidance and other shocks.
In the following part of this section, I characterize the distinctive elements of the model,
including the behavior of households, banks, producers, and the central bank. See Online
Appendix7 for thorough expositions of the model.
2.2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households of measure unity. Within
each household there are two types of members: workers and bankers. A fraction 1− f of
the household members are workers, and a fraction f are bankers. Workers provide labor and
earn wages. Each banker manages a financial intermediary and returns the profit back to the
household. Within the family there is perfect consumption insurance.
A banker this period remains a banker next period with probability θ , implying the
average survival time for a banker in any given period is 1/(1−θ). After the bankers exit, their
retained earnings return to their respective household in the form of dividends. The bankers who
exit become workers and are replaced by a similar number of workers randomly; thus the relative
proportion of each type is fixed. New bankers will get startup funds equal to Xt provided by the
household.
Let ct be consumption and lt labor supply. Then the household’s discounted utility ut is
given by:
ut = Et
∞
∑
j=0
β j[ln(ct+ j−hct+ j−1)− χ1+φ l
1+φ
t+ j ] (2.1)
where β ∈ (0,1) denotes the household’s subjective discount factor, h ∈ (0,1) governs the
strength of habits, and χ,φ > 0. The household’s inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is unity,
and its Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 1/φ .
7The Online Appendix can be found at http://acsweb.ucsd.edu/∼xuz039/pdfs/JobMarketPaperAppendix
XuZhang UCSD.pdf
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There are three types of assets that the household can hold. Households can borrow and
lend in a default-free one-period nominal bond market at the nominal interest rate it . Subject to
some transaction costs, they can also make private loans to non-financial firms to finance capital
to earn the real rate of return Rkt and hold a nominal long-term government bond to earn the real
rate of return Rbt .
Let Sht be the amount of private securities that households have. The transaction cost is
equal to the percentage 12κs(Sht−Sh)2/Sht of the value of the securities in its respective portfolio
for Sht > Sh. Similarly, for government bonds there is a holding cost equal to the percentage
1
2κb(Bht−Bh)2/Bht of the total value of government bonds held for Bht > Bh, where Bht is the
amount of long-term government bond that households have.
I define Pt as the price level of the consumption good. Qt is the real price of the private
securities at time t, and qt be the real price of the government bond at time t.
Accordingly, at time t the household faces a flow budget constraint in nominal term:
Ptct+PtDht+PtQt [Sht+
1
2
κs(Sht−Sh)2]+Ptqt [Bht+ 12κb(Bht−Bh)
2]+PtTt+PtXt
= PtWt lt+PtΠt+(1+ it−1)Pt−1Dht−1+Pt−1RktQt−1Sht−1+Pt−1Rbtqt−1Bht−1.
(2.2)
where Dht is the quantity of one-period nominal bond held by household at time t, Tt is the
lump-sum taxes in real term, Xt is the total transfer the household gives to its members that enter
banking at t, Wt is the real wage, and Πt are the payouts to the household from ownership of
both non-financial and financial firms in real term.
The household’s objective is to choose ct , lt , Dht , Sht and Bh,t to maximize (2.1) subject
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to (2.2). The first-order conditions are:
∂ut
∂ct
Wt = χl
φ
t
EtΛt,t+1Rt = 1
Sht−Sh = 1κsEtΛt,t+1(Rkt+1−Rt)
Bht−Bh = 1κbEtΛt,t+1(Rbt+1−Rt)
where the household’s stochastic discount factor is Λt,t+1 ≡ β ∂ut/∂ct∂ut/∂ct+1 .
Let pit ≡ PtPt−1 −1 be the inflation rate, then the link between nominal interest rate it and
real interest rate Rt is given by the Fisher equation:
1+ it = Rt(1+Etpit+1)
Following Woodford (2001) and other authors (e.g Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012),
Chen et al. (2012)), I model the nominal long-term government bond as a depreciating nominal
perpetuity that pays a geometrically declining coupon of ϑ n dollars in each period n= 1,2, . . .
after issuance. Let qnt ≡ Ptqt be the nominal price of the nominal bond. Then the ex-coupon real
rate of return on the nominal bond Rbt is given by
Rbt =
1/Pt+ϑqt
qt−1
=
1+ϑqnt
qnt−1(1+pit)
where the size of the next coupon payment is normalized to one dollar. The very simple
recursive structure above makes this type of long-term bond extremely convenient to work
with. By choosing ϑ appropriately, we match the perpetuity’s Macauley duration with the
corresponding 10-year zero-coupon Treasury bond.
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2.2.2 Banks
Banks lend funds obtained from households to non-financial firms and to the government.
In addition to acting as specialists that assist in channeling funds from savers to investors, they
engage in maturity transformation. They hold long-term assets and fund these assets with
short-term liabilities (beyond their own equity capital). Financial intermediaries in this model are
meant to capture the entire banking sector, i.e., investment banks as well as commercial banks.
Let nt be the amount of net worth that a banker/intermediary has at the end of period t, dt
the deposits the intermediary obtains from households, spt the quantity of financial claims on
non-financial firms that the intermediary holds, and bt the quantity of long-term government
bonds. The intermediary balance sheet is then given by:
Qtspt+qnt bpt = nt+dt (2.3)
Net worth is accumulated through retained earnings. It is thus the difference between the
gross return on assets and the cost of liabilities:
nt = RktQt−1spt−1+Rbtqnt−1bpt−1−Rt−1dt (2.4)
The banker’s objective is to maximize the discounted stream of payouts back to the
household, where the relevant discount rate is the household’s inter-temporal marginal rate of
substitution. The terminal wealth is given by:
Vt = Et
∞
∑
i=1
(1−θ)θ i−1Λt,t+int+i (2.5)
To motivate a limit on the bank’s ability to obtain deposits, Gertler and Karadi (2011)
introduce a moral hazard/costly enforcement problem. At the beginning of the period, the banker
can choose to divert funds from the assets he holds and transfer the proceeds to the household of
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which he is a member. The cost to the banker is that the depositors can force the intermediary
into bankruptcy and recover the remaining fraction of assets. However, it is too costly for the
depositors to recover the funds that the banker diverted. It is assumed that it is easier for the bank
to divert funds from its holdings of private loans than from its holding of government bonds: it
can divert the fraction λ of its private loan portfolio and the fraction λ4 with 0 <4< 1 from
its government bond portfolio. Therefore, for depositors to be willing to supply funds to the
banker, the following incentive constraint must be satisfied:
Vt ≥ λQtspt+λ4qnt bpt (2.6)
The left side is what the banker would lose by diverting a fraction of assets. The right
side is the gain from doing so. The banker’s maximization problem is to choose st , bt , and dt to
maximize (2.5) subject to (2.3), (2.4), and (2.6). Let Γt be the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the incentive constraint. The first order conditions are:
EtΛ˜t,t+1(Rkt+1−Rt) = Γt1+Γt λ
EtΛ˜t,t+1(Rbt+1−Rt) =4 Γt1+Γt λ
with
Λ˜t,t+1 ≡ Λt,t+1Ωt+1
Ωt = 1−θ +θ ∂Vt∂nt
∂Vt
∂nt
= Λ˜t−1,t [(Rkt−Rt−1)φt+Rt−1]
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The constraints are:
Qtspt+4qnt bt = φtnt if Γt > 0
< φtnt if Γt = 0
where
φt =
EtΛ˜t,t+1Rt
λ −EtΛ˜t,t+1(Rkt+1−Rt)
2.2.3 Central bank’s asset purchases
The central bank is allowed to purchase quantities of private loans Sgt and long-term
government bonds Bgt . To finance these purchases, it issues risk-free short-term debt Dgt that
pays the safe market interest rate it . In particular, the central bank’s balance sheet is given by
QtSgt+qtBgt = Dgt .
When limits to arbitrage in the private market are operative, the central bank’s acquisition
of securities will have the effect of bidding up the prices on each of these instruments and down
the excess returns.
2.2.4 Aggregation
Let Spt be the total quantity of loans that banks intermediate, Bpt the total number of
government bonds they hold, and Nt their total net worth. Since neither component of the
maximum adjusted leverage ratio depends on bank-specific factors, we can simply sum across
the portfolio restriction on each individual bank to obtain
QtSpt ≤ φtNt−4qnt Bpt
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Total net worth evolves as the sum of the retained earnings by the fraction θ of surviving
bankers and the transfers that new bankers receive, X, as follows:
Nt =θ [(Rkt−Rt−1)
Qt−1Spt−1
Nt−1
+(Rbt−Rt−1)
qnt−1Bpt−1
Nt−1
+Rt−1]Nt−1+Xt
Let St and Bt be the total supplies of private loans and long-term government bonds,
respectively. Then by definition,
St = Spt+Sht+Sgt
Bt = Bpt+Bht+Bgt
We combine these identities with the balance constraint on the banks to obtain the
following relation for the total value of private securities intermediated:
Qt(St−Sht−Sgt)≤ φtNt−4qnt [Bt− (Bgt+Bht)] (2.7)
2.2.5 The Production Sector
Intermediate goods firms
The economy also contains a continuum of infintely-lived monopolistically competitive
firms, each producing a single differentiated good. Each operates a constant returns to scale
technology with capital and labor inputs and have identical Cobb-Douglas production functions:
Yt = At(ξtKt−1)α l1−αt
where ξt is a random disturbance that we refer to as a “capital quality” shock. The capital quality
shock as a simple way to introduce an exogenous source of variation in the return to capital. It
is best thought of as capturing some form of economic obsolescence, as opposed to physical
depreciation.
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To finance the new capital, the firm must obtain funding from a bank. Then by arbitrage,
the value of the security is equal to the market price of the capital underlying security: QtKt =
QtSt .
Let Pmt be the real marginal cost. Then the firm’s demand for labor and capital is given
by
Wt = Pmt(s)(1−α)Ytlt
Zt = Pmt(s)α
Yt
ξtKt−1
Then the real rate of return to the bank on the loan Rkt is given by
Rkt =
Zt+(1−δ )Qt
Qt−1
ξt
The capital accumulation equation is:
Kt = ξtKt−1(1−δ )+ It
Capital goods producers
Capital producers make new capital using input of final output and subject to adjustment
costs. They sell the new capital to firms at the price Qt . Given that households own capital
producers, the objective function of a capital producer is
Et
∞
∑
j=0
Λt,t+ j{Qt+ jIt+ j− [1+ f ( It+ jIt+ j−1 )]It+ j}
Final goods firms
The output of each firm s is purchased by a perfectly competitive final goods sector, which
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aggregates the differentiated goods into a single final good using a CES production technology:
Yt = [
∫ 1
0
Yt(s)
ε−1
ε ds]
ε
ε−1
where Yt denotes the quantity of the final good. Each intermediate firm s thus faces a downward-
sloping demand curve for its product with elasticity 1/(ε−1). Then
Yt(s) = (
pt(s)
Pt
)
−ε/(ε−1)
Yt
where Pt is the CES aggregate price of the final good:
Pt = [
∫ 1
0
pt(s)1/1−εds]1−ε
Firms set prices optimally subject to nominal rigidities in the form of Calvo (1983) price
contracts, which expire with probability 1− γ each period. Each time a Calvo contract expires,
the firm sets a new contract price freely, which then remains in effect for the life of the new
contract. When a firm’s price contract expires, the firm s chooses the new contract price p∗t (s)
to maximize the value to shareholders of the firm’s cash flows over the lifetime of the contract.
In between these periods, the firm is able to partially index its price to the steady state rate of
inflation. The objective function is:
Et
∞
∑
j=0
(1− γ)γ jΛt,t+ j[ p
∗
t (s)
Pt+ j
(1+ p¯i) jγp− ε
ε−1Pmt+ j(s)]Yt+ j(s)
The evolution of the price level is:
Pt = [(1− γ)(P∗t )1−ε + γ(p¯iγpPt−1)1−ε ]1/(1−ε)
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2.2.6 Monetary Policy
This section describes the monetary policy by the central bank. There are two types of
policies: the forward guidance and the asset purchases.
The central bank sets the one-period nominal interest rate it according to the following
policy rule,
i∗t = r+ p¯i+κpi(pit− p¯i)+κy(logYt− logY ∗t )+ zt
it = max{ι , i∗t }
where ι is the lower bound on the one-period nominal interest rate, i∗t is the rate the central bank
would set if it was unconstrained, r =−logβ denotes the steady-state one-period real interest
rate, Y ∗t is the natural (flexible-price equilibrium) level of output. For simplicity, minus the
price markup is used as a proxy for the output gap. Based on the previous work of Lase´en and
Svensson (2011), Del Negro et al. (2015) and Keen et al. (2016), which use a combination of
current and anticipated monetary policy shocks to model forward guidance shocks8, I model zt ,
the monetary policy deviation at time t as
zt = εmt,t+
T
∑
j=1
a jεmt,t− j (2.8)
for a give T ≥ 0, where εm,t ≡ (εmt,t ,εmt+1,t , . . . ,εmt+T,t)′ is a zero-mean i.i.d. random (T +1)-vector
realized in the beginning of period t and called the innovation in period t. εm,t can be interpreted
as the new information the central bank announces in the beginning of period t about current and
future periods.9 a j governs the size of each shock.
In order to determine the magnitude of a j, where j > 0, I follow the specification in
8Best and Kapinos (2016) studies how monetary policy should be conducted in the presence of anticipated
shocks.
9 It follows that the dynamics of the deviation and the projection zt = (zt ,zt+1,t , . . . ,zt+T,t)′ can be written
zt+1 = Azzt + εm,t+1
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Bundick and Smith (2016). They assume that the series of the size is an exponential decay
process. In this case equation (2.8) could be rewritten as,
zt,t = εmt,t+
T
∑
j=1
ρ jz ε
m
t,t− j.
In addition to the interest rate monetary policy, the central bank could conduct monetary
policy through direct purchases of government bonds. During the crisis, the central bank
purchases a fraction ϕbt of the outstanding stock of long-term government bonds:
Bgt = ϕbtBt
Following Gertler and Karadi (2013), ϕbt obeys second-order stationary stochastic pro-
cesses to capture the cumulative buildup of asset purchases program.
ϕbt = ρ0b+ρ1bϕbt−1+ρ2bϕbt−2+ εbt (2.9)
The reason why the central bank’s credit policy works is as follows. When the bank faces
balance constraint shown in equation (2.7), given the total quantity of bank equity, an increase
in the central bank’s holding of long-term government bonds will increase the total demand for
private securities. Since asset supplies are relatively inelastic in the short run, the enhanced asset
demand pushes up the real price of capital Qt and pushes down the excess return on capital.
Furthermore, the presence of inelastic household security demands will strengthen the effects.
where the (T +1)× (T +1) matrix Az is defined as
Az ≡
[
0T×1 IT
0 01×T
]
.
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2.2.7 Government, Resource Constraint and Equilibrium
Let Gt be the government spending at time t, and Gss be the steady state level of
government spending. The government budget constraint is
Gt+(Rbt−1)Bt = Tt+(Rkt−Rt−1)Qt−1Sgt−1+(Rbt−Rt−1)qnt−1Bgt−1
Equilibrium in the final goods market requires
Yt =Ct+[1+ f (
It
It−1
)]It+Gt
Market clearing in markets for private securities, long-term government bonds and labor.
The supply of private securities at the end of period t is given by the sum of newly acquired
capital It and leftover capital from last period:
St = It+(1−δ )Kt−1
The supply of long-term government bonds is fixed by the government: Bt = B¯. This
completes the description of the model.
2.3 Calibration and Simulation of the Structural Model
2.3.1 Calibration
Table 2.1 lists the choice of parameter values for the model.
I begin with the parameters that have the same value as in Gertler and Karadi (2013).
These are shown in Panel (A). I assign a quarterly value of 0.995, which implies short-term real
interest rate of 2%.The depreciation rate of capital δ is set to be 0.025, and the capital share α is
0.33. The price rigidity parameter γ is 0.779, which implies firms resetting prices approximately
every 13.6 months on average. The degree of price indexation γp is assumed to be zero. The
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steady-state leverage ratio is 4 as in their 2011 paper (6 in their 2013 paper). The steady state
government expenditure share Gss/Y is 0.2, and the steady state labor is 1/3. φy = −0.125
for the Taylor rule coefficient on output gap. I set K¯h so that in steady state, households hold
half the quantity of private securities, and B¯h so that households hold three-quarters of the
outstanding stock of long-term government debt. B¯ is set such as the ratio of the stock of long-
term government bond to output in steady state is equal to its pre-crisis value of approximately
0.45. The AR(2) coefficients for the LSAP shock are 1.5 and -0.55.
However, some of the other parameters used by GK imply properties of the yield curve
and the relation between bond and stock yields that are inconsistent with the observed data.
Since interpreting the response of the yield curve to shocks is the focus of the present exercise, I
have made a number of changes so that the predictions of the model better match the properties
observed in financial data.
Panel (B) shows the parameters that are closely related to yield curve properties. GK
assume an inflation target p¯i = 0. To match the average values of the nominal interest rate in the
pre-ZLB data from Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2007) dataset, I set p¯i = 0.006, corresponding to an annual
inflation target of 2.4%. Thus the steady state value of nominal interest rate is 4.4%. GK assume
a lower bound of 0 in their original calibration. But the short end of the yield curve was never
literally zero, with excess reserves earning 0.25% interest from the Fed throughout this period.
For this reason, I set ι = 0.25%.
The other parameters in Panel (B) matter for the steady state bond excess return and
equity excess return. GK set the steady state real excess return on long-term government bonds
to be 50 basis points and real excess return on private securities 100 basis points. Since there is
no observed series for the real interest rate on an overnight government bond, I use the 2-year
inflation-indexed Treasuries (TIPS) yield instead. Taken from the updated Gu¨rkaynak et al.
(2010) online dataset, from 2004 to 2007 the average difference between a 10-year TIPS and
a 2-year TIPS is 69 basis points10, which is much larger than GK’s implied spread of 33 basis
10I use the 2004-2007 period to avoid both the low liquidity of TIPS in its first few years and the financial crisis
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points. By contrast, my parameters imply a predicted spread that is exactly equal to 69 basis
points. For the private securities, I follow GK to use the information on pre-2008 spreads between
mortgage rates and 10-year Treasury yield and between BAA corporate and 10-year Treasury
yield. Using data from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED), I find that on
average the former is 163 basis points and the latter is 353 basis points from January 1990 to
November 2008.11 Therefore, I set the steady state excess return on private securities to be 172
basis points, higher than the 100 basis points in GK.
The expected horizon for bankers, the steady-state leverage ratio, together with the two
excess return values mentioned above, pin down the θ , λ , ∆, and X , where the parameter λ is the
percent of funds that a bank can divert to his household. Since I have adjusted the excess return
values, I need to adjust the other targets to make the implied λ still realistic. Therefore, I choose
an expected horizon of 5.7 years instead of 8.77 years for bankers. As a result, the implied value
for λ becomes 38.4%, close to the 38.1% in their 2011 paper and 34.5% in their 2013 paper.
The remaining part of Panel (B) is the household portfolio adjustment cost parameters κs
and κb. These parameters are chosen to make the predicted effects of LSAP on medium-term
bond yields more consistent with the data in the crisis. Since I have made the above changes, I
also have to make adjustment for those parameters.
Panel (C) presents other parameters used by GK that differ substantially from previous
studies and turn out to raise the possibility of some odd dynamics of the model. I have found that
the model is much more realistic when more conventional values are used for these parameters. I
set the habit parameter h= 0.615, close to the estimated value in Christiano et al. (2005), instead
of 0.815 in Gertler and Karadi (2013). GK assume a value for 1/φ , the Frisch labor supply
elasticity, equal to 3.6. I instead set 1/φ = 2. GK assume an elasticity of substitution ε between
goods of 4.167, implying a steady-state markup of 31.58%. My exercise sets ε = 6, implying a
and recession. Over this sample, real yields average between about 1.4% and 2.1%.
11Another way is look at the relative size of the two excess returns. The average ratio of the spread between
10-year Treasury yield and federal funds rate over the spread between BAA and federal funds rate is 0.29 while over
the spread between 30-year mortgage rate and federal funds rate is 0.87. My calibration implies 0.6.
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more realistic markup of 20%. GK assume an inverse elasticity of investment with respect to the
price of capital, ηi, of 1.728. I instead use ηi = 4.5, close to the prior mean of the DSGE model
estimated by Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008). The coefficient for the Taylor rule φpi is taken
from Coibion et al. (2012).
Finally, there is one parameter that is new to our model, ρz, which governs the decaying
behavior of the forward guidance shock. In the crisis experiment below, we’ve chosen ρz equal to
0.65 to match the evidence on the impact of forward guidance on the term structure. In Section
2.7, I discuss the effects of forward guidance persistence.
2.3.2 Solution Method
I solve the model using the OccBin toolkit developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015).
The solution method constructs a piecewise linear approximation to the original nonlinear model.
It allows us to model the occasionally-binding zero lower bound and solve for the short-term and
long-term yields.
2.3.3 Crisis Experiment
I now explore how the unconventional monetary policy works in the context of a financial
crisis as described in Gertler and Karadi (2011, 2013). The initiating shock for the crisis is a
decline in capital quality. It forces the asset prices to decline and the excess return of capital
to rise, which depresses real activity and in turn amplifies the downturn. Further, the drops of
output and inflation are sufficiently sharp to push the economy to the point where the nominal
interest rate hits the zero lower bound.
I suppose that the shock obeys a first-order autoregressive process with coefficient 0.88.
I consider three scenarios:
(i) capital quality shock without central bank response,
(ii) capital quality shock with forward guidance,
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(iii) capital quality shock with LSAP.
As discussed in Keen et al. (2016) and Bundick and Smith (2016), initial state of the
economy matters for the performance of unconventional monetary policy. Swanson and Williams
(2014) have examined the number of quarters until the private sector expected the funds rate to
be 25 bp or higher using the the median “consensus” response to the monthly Blue Chip survey
of professional forecasters. Their findings show that Blue Chip consensus expectation of the
length of time fluctuated between two and five quarters before August 2011, and private-sector
expectations of the time until lift-off jumped to seven or more quarters after that. In addition,
most of the literature has specified the length of the zero lower bound period to be between 1 and
7 quarters. In the baseline result presented here, the initial shock will have the nominal shadow
rate will fall to negative 121 basis points with the a total zero lower bound episode of 4 quarters.
In Section 2.7, I show the identification is robust to shallower (60 basis points) and deeper (180
basis points) initial shadow rates.
Figure 2.2 plots the the responses of capital quality, short-term nominal interest rate,
output, inflation, the excess return of capital as well as the 10-year Treasury yield in the model
to a negative capital quality shock. The solid red lines are the impulse responses not considering
the zero lower bound; in contrast, the blue-dash lines with the zero lower bound constraint.
The initial decrease of capital quality drives up the real excess return of capital. The process is
amplified as the asset fire sale and decline in real activity further weaken bank’s balance sheets.
As Figure 2.2 shows, the existence of zero lower bound will make the recession more severe. The
real output drops about 3 percent at the peak, and the annual inflation rate drops 2 percentage
points in the initial.
The forward guidance horizon T is set to last 7 quarters. On one hand, the horizon must
be larger than the ZLB episode to allow the monetary policy to provide stimulus. On the other
hand, a promise to hold the interest rate down for at a date T arbitrarily distant in the future has
a surprisingly large effect in models like this one. Among other practical issues, it’s not clear
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how the FOMC can commit future Fed chairs to a particular policy.12 In the Section 2.7, I show
the final results are robust whether we have shorter (6 quarters) or longer (8 quarters) forward
guidance horizon.
I define that one unit of forward guidance shock will lower the nominal shadow rate by
25 basis points on impact. With parameter calibration in Section 2.3, this requires to set each
element of εm,t ≡ (εmt,t ,εmt+1,t , . . . ,εmt+T,t)′ to be -0.11%. I define that one unit of LSAP shock will
lower the 10-year yield by 5 basis points. It requires to set εbt in equation 2.9 to be 7%.
Figure 2.3 plots how much difference the unconventional monetary policy made to the
response of the yield curve in addition to the negative capital quality shock. One unit easing
forward guidance shock will decrease the annualized shadow short-term nominal interest rate by
25 basis points, the current output by 0.02 percent, and the current annualized inflation rate by
0.08 percentage points. One unit easing LSAP shock will raise the shadow short-term nominal
interest rate by 44 basis points, the current output by 0.1 percent, and the current annualized
inflation rate by 0.18 percentage points.
2.4 Yield Curve Interpolation
Because we cannot directly observe the daily change in ex-ante shadow rate in the data,
we use a flexible approximation to the shape of the model implied yield curve and compare it
with the data. One can think this is the bridge linking the model in Section 2.3 and the empirical
analysis in Section 2.5.
2.4.1 Yield curve interpolation when away from the ZLB
First I consider the case when the economy is far away from the ZLB, so that i∗t = it (the
shadow rate equals the observed one-period rate). Suppose there are two possibly unobserved
factors, (ξ1t ,ξ2t) that summarize everything that matters for determining interest rates. Their
12 McKay et al. (2015) suggest refinements to make models of long-term forward guidance more realistic. Here I
simply limit the potential reach of forward guidance to 7 quarters.
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Q-measure dynamics are characterized by
ξ1t = φ1ξ1t−1+ ε1t
ξ2t = φ2ξ2t−1+ ε2t
The one-period nominal interest rate it is given by
it = ξ1t+ξ2t (2.10)
Then the nominal forward rate at date t at horizon n is
fnt = E
Q
t (it+n) = φn1 ξ1t+φ
n
2 ξ2t (2.11)
The yield at date t with maturity n is
int = n−1
n−1
∑
j=0
f jt
When φ1 = 1 and |φ2|< 1, this framework implies the Dynamic Nelson-Siegel model:
int = ξ1t+n−1
1−φn2
1−φ2 ξ2t (2.12)
Equations (2.10) and (2.12) allow us to recover the two factors directly off the level of
one-period rate it and the long-term rate, iNt :
ξ2t = (N−1
1−φN2
1−φ2 −1)
−1(iNt− it)
ξ1t = it−ξ2t
Moreover, once ξ1t and ξ2t are known, I can interpolate the entire yield curve using
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equation 2.12.
2.4.2 Yield curve interpolation at the lower bound
Next we consider the case i∗t = ξ1t+ξ2t < ι , it = ι . Wu and Xia (2016) demonstrate that
in equilibrium, the forward rates fnt can be approximated as
f ∗nt = ξ1t+φ
n
2 ξ2t
fnt = ι+σng(
f ∗nt− ι
σn
)
where g(z) = zΦ(z)+φ(z) for Φ(z) the cumulative distribution function for a standard Normal
variable and φ(z) the density, and σn is a parameter.
I have
int = n−1
n−1
∑
j=0
f jt ,
which along with i∗t = ξ1t+ξ2t give two equations in two unknowns to determine (ξ1t ,ξ2t) from
the model-implied interest rates (i∗t , iNt).
2.4.3 Calibration for the yield curve interpolation
I need to choose the parameter values for φ2, ι and σn. I calculate φ2 using average yield
curve shape in the pre-ZLB period. The yield data is from Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2007)’s online
dataset. The first row of Table 2.2 reports average yields from January 1990 to November 2007,
a span that excludes the Great Inflation as well as the Great Recession periods which I refer as
pre-ZLB period. Over this sample, the average nominal 1-year Treasury yields is about 4.57
percent, and the average nominal 10-year Treasury yields is about 6 percent. I choose (ξ1, ξ2,
φ2) such as the fitted yield curve best matched the average yield curve. It turns out that ξ1 = 7,
ξ2 =−2.77, φ2 = 0.979.
I use the same φ2 along with the model steady state values of the one-period and long
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term rates, iss and iNss, to construct the yield curve implied by the model steady state. It turns out
that ξ1 = 6.23, ξ2 =−1.62 give the best fit. The second row of Table 2.2 reports the nominal
yield curves implied by the model. The model is able to reproduce these features of the data
quite well: the average level of nominal yields in the model between about 5.4 and 6.4 percent,
with an upward slope of 109 bp.
I calibrate σn by following Krippner (2016),
σn =
√
ρ21n+ρ
2
2G(2φ3,n)+2ρ12ρ1ρ2G(φ3,n)
where ρ1, ρ2, ρ12 and φ3 are parameters estimated from an arbitrage-free Nelson and Siegel
(1987) model with two state-variables (level and slope), and G(φ3,n) = 1φ3 [1− exp(−φ3n)]. ρ1,
ρ2, ρ12 and φ3 are estimated to be equal to 0.0111, 0.0142, -0.7390 and 0.2498 using 6 months,
1, 2, 5, 7, and 10 years monthly Treasury yield data from January 2009 to November 2015.
Next, I compute the implied yield curve during the ZLB period using the impulse
responses of interest rates derived from the structural model. Panel B of Table 2.2 compares
the yield data during the ZLB period with the interpolated data. Between November 2008 and
November 2015, the average nominal 1-year Treasury yields was about 0.27 percentage points,
and the average nominal 10-year Treasury yields was about 2.80 percentage points. Although
the simulated model cannot capture the dramatic drop of the 10-year Treasury bond yield, it
improves upon GK’s specification.
Figure 2.4 shows the paper’s key identification. It illustrates the difference between the
yield curves in scenarios (i) and (ii) and the difference between (i) and (iii). As shown in the
figure, one unit of easing forward guidance lowers Treasury yields at all maturities, with a peak
effect at a maturity of about 20 months. In contrast, one unit easing LSAP will increase the
shortest-maturity Treasury yields because of the feedback of the interest rate rule but will lower
medium-term and long-term yields, with the peak effect on the longest maturities. I use4i f gn ,
where n =2,3,...,10 to represent the effects of one unit of forward guidance on the various interest
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rates, and4i f gn , where n =2,3,...,10 to represent the effects of one unit of asset purchases on
the various interest rates.
2.5 Decomposition of the Federal Reserve’s announcement
In this section, I decompose the responses of various interest rates according to the driven
forces and look at the sizes and effects of forward guidance and LSAP over time.
2.5.1 Information and monetary policy components of the announce-
ment
Following studies on high-frequency identification, I assume that the movements of
Treasury yields on various horizons in a daily window that brackets the Fed’s announcement
days are responses to the Fed’s announcements only. That assumption exploits the fact that
a lumpy amount of monetary policy news is released during a short period. The Fed could
surprise the markets (i) by announcing a monetary policy path deviating from the private sector’s
previous expectations, (ii) by announcing an asset purchase program that also deviates from
the private sector’s previous expectations, or (iii) by shaping the private sector’s beliefs about
economic conditions. I refer to (i) as forward guidance and (ii) as LSAP, both of which are
exogenous monetary policy deviations, whereas I refer to (iii) as the effects of information. In
recent literature on the topic, Campbell et al. (2012) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) have
provided extensive evidence of the information effects.
The focus of this paper is on the first two effects. In the rest of this section, I provide
estimates of how the effects of information influence financial markets but leave the analysis of
those effects on the macroeconomy to future studies13.
To disentangle the Federal Reserve’s information effect, I follow Zhang (2018) and
perform a regression of the observed changes of yields at each maturity on Green Book forecasts
13To study the information effects on the macro variables, one may need a model with the following features, (i)
the central bank has superior information about the fundamentals, (ii) private sectors update their belief after the
banks’ announcement, and (iii) there are various interest rates or stock prices in the model thus they respond to the
Fed’s information differently from other policy shocks.
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and use the residuals to represent the monetary policy component of the Fed’s announcement. In
particular, I estimate the following equation for each yield at maturity n:
4int = βn04int−1+βniint +
s
∑
j=−1
β4INFLn j 4INFLGBt,q+ j+
s
∑
j=−1
β4RealGDPn j 4RealGDPGBt,q+ j
+
s
∑
j=−1
β INFLn j INFL
GB
d,q+ j+
s
∑
j=−1
βRealGDPn j RealGDP
GB
t,q+ j+
s
∑
j=−1
βUNEMPn j UNEMP
GB
t,q+ j
+ constant+ εnt , for all t (2.13)
where t indexes the event day, 4int is the observed daily change of interest rate of maturity
n at event date t; and int− is the level of the interest rate before any changes associated with
the announcement, which is included to capture any tendency toward mean reversion in Fed’s
behavior. Let q be the quarter when the announcement day t takes place. INFLGBt,q+ j denotes
Greenbook forecasts for inflation for quarter q+ j made at event day t, j=-1,0,1, 2. RealGDPGBt,q+ j
denotes Greenbook forecasts for real GDP for quarter q+ j made at event date m. 4INFLGBt,q+ j
and4RealGDPGBm,q+ j is the revised forecast for inflation and real GDP growth rate between two
consecutive events, respectively. In computing the forecast innovations, the forecast horizons for
event t and t−1 are adjusted so that the forecasts refer to the same quarter. The data period for
the regression is from 1990:2m to 2013:12m.
I use the fitted value of the each regression,4iin f ont , to approximate the change caused by
the Fed’s superior information and use the residuals of each regression,4impnt , as the monetary
policy component.
2.5.2 Decomposition of monetary policy component into forward guid-
ance and LSAP
Next I will decompose the monetary policy component, 4impnt , into forward guidance
component and LSAP component. Figure 2.4 is used for identification. In the figure, the blue
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dashed line plots how one unit of easing forward guidance shock will immediately change
the yields at various maturities. And the red solid line plots the effects of one unit of easing
LSAP shock. I collect the values of 4i f gn and 4ilsapn , where n =2,3,...,10 and use them as the
explanatory variables in a regression of the following form to estimate how many units of forward
guidance and LSAP for each event date t:
4impnt = β f gt ×4i f gn +β lsapt ×4ilsapn + εnt , for n= 2,3, · · · ,10 (2.14)
There are 9 observations in the regression. There is a separate regression for each of the event day
t from 2008:11m to 2013:12m. The parameters of interests in the regression equation are β f gt
and β lsapt , which represent the size of forward guidance and LSAP on event date t, respectively.
2.5.3 Data
For the event days, I obtain FOMC meeting dates between February 1990 and December
2004 from the appendix in Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005)14 and all remaining scheduled FOMC
meetings from the Federal Reserve Board’s website. By following the literature, I also add some
days during the ZLB period when the chairperson of the Fed’s delivered important speeches. In
particular, there were 63 event days from November 2008 to December 2015.
For the Green Book data, I download them on the Philadelphia Fed website15. The
original Green Book can also be accessed on the website of the Board of Governors. Because
Green Book data are released approximately five years later than the meeting day, the latest data
that I can access represent December 2013.
14As stated in their paper, prior to 1994, the FOMC did not explicitly announce changes in its target for the
federal funds rate, but such changes were implicitly communicated to financial markets through the size and type of
open market operation. Therefore, they define a monetary policy announcement date to be the one of the next open
market operation following the FOMC decision.
15https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/greenbook-data/philadelphia-data-set.
This data set will be updated annually, usually in April.
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2.5.4 Estimated size of forward guidance and LSAP
Figure 2.1 plots the estimates for β f gt and β
lsap
t between November 2008 and December
2013. The vertical axis charts the size of shocks. As described in section 2.3.3, I have defined a
one-unit forward guidance shock to lower the nominal shadow rate by 25 basis points on impact.
I define a one-unit LSAP shock to lower the 10-year yield by 5 basis points on impact. Several
notable announcements, which I discuss in Section 2.6, are labeled in the figure for reference.
Unsurprisingly, forward guidance and LSAP policies announced on the same day always work
in the same direction - that is, by either tightening or easing the market. Among all event dates,
the QE I announcements have the greatest effects.
2.5.5 Estimated contribution of forward guidance and LSAP to the
interest rates
Column 1 in Table 2.3 lists the announcement dates, whereas Columns 2 to 6 list results
of interest rate decomposition.
Figure 2.5 plots the observed interest rate change4int , information part4iin f ont and the
monetary policy part4impnt from 1990:2m to 2013:12m.
Figure 2.6 plots β f gt ×4i f gn and β lsapt ×4ilsapn , contribution by forward guidance and
asset purchases respectively.
2.5.6 Estimated contribution of forward guidance and LSAP to the real
activities
Assessing the financial market effects of asset purchases is the first step in gauging the
effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy actions. The next goal of this paper is to look at
to what extent monetary policy has fostered economic growth and inflation stability.
Given β f gt and β
lsap
t , I simulate the model described in Section 2.2 and obtain the impulse
responses of macroeconomic variables to β f gt units of forward guidance shock and β
lsap
2t units
of LSAP shock, separately. The high-frequency yield data is used to figure out the sizes of
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each type of shocks while the structural model is to show the persistence of the monetary policy
shocks on aggregate economy.
The last 4 columns of Table 2.3 give the effects on GDP and inflation that the model
predicts would occur two quarters after each shock. The change in GDP is measured by percent,
and change in inflation is measured by annualized percentage points.
2.6 Unconventional Monetary Policy on Several Key FOMC
Announcement Days
I follow the literature and group the announcement dates into the following six phases:
QE I phase (November 2008 to March 2010), QE II phase (November 2010 to June 2011),
“Operation Twist” phase (September 2011 to August 2012), QE III phase (September 2012 to
May 2013), “Tapering” phase (June 2013 to October 2014), and Post QE phase (December 2014
to December 2015), respectively.16 Although some of the phases’ names are associated with QE,
there is forward guidance policy component in those periods as well. Among all the event days,
there are several key announcements widely discussed in the literature. The dates are grouped
into different sections, and the cumulative effects over the certain phase are shown at the end of
each section of Table 2.3 .
2.6.1 QE I phase (November 2008 to March 2010)
The “QE I” program began on November 25, 2008, when the Federal Reserve Board
announced it would purchase $600 billion of mortgage-backed securities and $100 billion of
debt issued by the mortgage-related government-sponsored enterprises. In Figure 2.7, I plot
the decomposition of yield curve changes into information and monetary policy components in
the upper left panel. The upper right panel compares the non-info component with the fitted
value from regression equation 2.14. We notice that the major movement of the interest rates,
especially the median and the long-term ones, were driven by the information effects. Even
16The categorization of QE I, QE II, “Operation Twist” and QE III comes from Wu (2014).
52
though there’s no explicit words about the forward guidance policy, I argue, as in Bauer and
Rudebusch (2014), LSAP announcements may signal to market participants that the central bank
has changed its views on current or future economic conditions, which leads investors to alter
their expectations of the future path of the policy rate. According to the structural model, a LSAP
policy will drive up the output and inflation in the near term, to which the interest rate rule would
respond with higher short-term rates in the near future. Therefore, the Fed needs to communicate
to the public that this is not its intention to raise the short-term rate in response to the higher
inflation and output that LSAP is expected to generate. This argument justifies why we see the
LSAP is always used together with forward guidance as shown in Figure 2.1. In particular, based
on the way yield curve responded, I have identified that there are easing forward guidance as
well as LSAP on November 25, 2008. The overall effect of the two types of policies is lowering
the whole yield curve. The middle panels show the effects of forward guidance shock and LSAP
on the yield curve. 90% confidence intervals are shown in both cases. The lower panels show the
impulse responses of output and inflation for the current and next 8 quarters. As for GDP, LSAP
plays an important role in lifting output growth path. Forward guidance has similar effect on
current inflation compared to LASP, but LSAP is more effective afterwards.
On December 16, 2008, the FOMC decreased the target for the policy rate to a range
from 0 to 1/4 percent and indicated that it expected the target to remain there “for some time”. In
addition, it also stated that the Fed will continue to consider ways of using its balance sheet to
further support credit markets and economic activity. My identification of forward guidance and
LSAP effects shown in Figure 2.8 lowers both short-term and long-term interest rate as a whole
with long-term rate decreasing by more.
On January 28, 2009, the FOMC restated that the Fed will continue to consider ways
of using its balance sheet to further support credit markets and economic activity. However,
the FOMC statement was interpreted by some market participants as disappointing because of
its lack of concrete language regarding the possibility and timing of purchases of longer-term
Treasuries in the secondary market. There my identification procedure finds contractionary
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forward guidance and LSAP shocks as in Figure 2.9.
As shown in Table 2.3, the cumulative drop in 10-year Treasury yield in the seven
key announcement dates in QE I phase was 80 basis points, 42 basis points contributed by
information effects while 38 basis points by monetary policy component. Forward guidance
explained 5 basis points and the LSAP 35 basis points. My estimates indicate that the QE I
program increased the two-quarter hence real GDP by 1.11 percent, 0.39 percent from forward
guidance and 0.72 percent from LSAP. Forward guidance raised the two-quarter hence inflation
rate by 0.60 annualized percentage points, and LSAP has an effect of 0.21 annualized percentage
points. Thus the total effects on inflation is 0.81 percentage points. I conclude that LSAP are
more effective on output, while forward guidance is more effective on inflation in the short run.
2.6.2 QE II phase (November 2010 to June 2011)
It’s also interesting that the FOMC’s subsequent QE II program, launched on November
3, 2010, has very small easing forward guidance and LSAP components, which are not significant
at 10% level. A possible reason in the literature (e.g. Krishnamurthy et al. (2011), Bauer and
Rudebusch (2014)) is that expectations of QE II were incrementally formed before official
confirmation. The event study on the single QE II official announcement day may underestimate
the full effect of the program. Therefore, I also include some important pre-announcement QE
II news. For example, on September 21, 2010, the FOMC was “prepared to provide additional
accommodation if needed”, which was viewed as a setup statement to another round of asset
purchases. As shown in Figure 2.1, I estimate a forward guidance factor and a LSAP factor in
easing direction on this day.
2.6.3 Mid-2013 phase (November 2010 to June 2011)
August 9, 2011 is another interesting date. This is the first announcement in which the
FOMC gave explicit forward guidance about the likely path of the federal funds rate over the
next several quarters. In that announcement, the FOMC stated that it expected the current level
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of the federal funds rate would be appropriate “at least through mid-2013”. In Figure 2.10 I
estimate that the forward guidance raises the two-quarter ahead output by 0.18 percent and the
inflation by 0.54 annualized percentage points, and the LSAP raises the two-quarter ahead output
by 0.27 percent and the inflation by 0.36 annualized percentage points.
2.6.4 “Operation Twist” (September 2011 to August 2012)
September 21, 2011 is one of the dates when our results are different from Swanson
(2017). It corresponds to “Operation Twist”. The FOMC announced to purchase $400 billion
of Treasury securities of median-and long maturities and to sell an equal amount of short-term
Treasury securities. This program “should put downward pressure on longer-term interest
rates and help make broader financial conditions more accommodative.” Swanson (2017)’s
identification procedure for forward guidance vs. LSAP announcements attributes the effects of
this announcement to a tightening forward guidance and an easing LSAP factor. It is surprising
for the two types of unconventional monetary polices implied from the same announcement to
have different directions. However, as can be seen in Figure 2.11, my identification estimates
this announcement to have both LSAP and forward guidance components in the easing direction.
The forward guidance on that day decreased the l0-year Treasury yield by 1 basis points, while
the LSAP had an effect of 9 basis points.
2.6.5 QE III phase (September 2012 to May 2013)
The economy continued to disappoint policymakers and the Fed issued the statement on
September 13, 2012 meeting promising to maintain a zero federal funds rate “at least through
mid-2015”. In addition, the Fed said it would continue to extend the average maturity of
its holdings of securities and announced an open ended program purchasing additional agency
mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. This announcement put downward
pressure on longer-term interest rates. The two-quarter hence real GDP was predicted to increase
by 0.25 percent and the inflation by 0.22 annualized percentage points
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On December 12, 2012, the FOMC again adjusted its forward guidance from the calendar-
based language “at least through mid-2015” to forward guidance based on unemployment and
expected inflation. The policy statement read: “...this exceptionally low range for the federal
funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2
percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half
percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal”. This resulted in some
concerns of the investors that the central bank would have to start tightening policy earlier than
the time they anticipated before.17 Therefore, the medium-term and long-term yields increase.
2.6.6 Tapering (June 2013 to October 2014)
On June 19, 2013, there is little change in the FOMC statement on that date, but the
FOMC released economic projections along with the statement that showed a substantial increase
in the FOMC’s economic outlook. Given earlier remarks by Chairman Ben Bernanke that the
FOMC could begin tapering its asset purchases soon, markets interpreted this as a signal that a
tapering was imminent. In addition, the FOMC statement says, “...14 of 19 FOMC participants
indicated that they expect the first increase in the target for the federal funds rate to occur in
2015, and one expected the first increase to incur in 2016”. Thus, this episode fits into the “taper
tantrum” period, and I have identified a large tightening forward guidance factor and a medium
size tightening LSAP factor. In Figure 2.12, I have estimated that the forward guidance would
decrease the two-quarter ahead output by 0.26 percent and the inflation by 0.37 annualized
percentage points, and the LSAP would decrease the two-quarter ahead output by 1.51 percent
and the inflation by 1.53 annualized percentage points.
On September 18, 2013, the FOMC was widely expected to begin tapering its asset
purchase while it turned out not to do so. As shown in Table 2.3, the surprise decision by the
FOMC not to taper its asset purchases is correctly identified in my estimates: the easing LSAP
shock together with easing forward guidance shock had a result of 17 basis points drop of the
17https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324481204578175112571119362
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10-year yield. This in turn would raise the two-quarter ahead real GDP by 0.84 percent and the
inflation by 0.73 annualized percentage points.
On December 18, 2013, the policy statement said that “... it likely will be appropriate to
maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate well past the time that the unemploy-
ment rate declines below 6-1/2 percent, especially if projected inflation continues to run below
the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal.” Evidence shows the labor market had improved
and as a result, the FOMC decided to begin tapering their monthly asset purchases. The new
language on unemployment was probably added to prevent the market from moving up the date
in which they expect the federal funds rate to rise. Figure 2.13 show that the overall effect is
contractionary.
2.7 Discussion
In this section, I first show that the information and monetary policy decomposition is
crucial for the monetary policy evaluation. I then conduct several robustness checks and show
that my specification is robust to alternative assumptions.
2.7.1 The importance of isolating the monetary policy component
I redo all the above analysis except that I use the total change in yield curve instead of
the monetary policy component. The estimated effects are that the QE I program (November
2008 to March 2010) increased real GDP by 2.94 percent and inflation by 2.8 percentage points,
which is three times as large as the one I estimated in the previous section.
2.7.2 Robustness check
The initial state
In the baseline model, the initial capital quality shock decreases the shadow rate to
negative 121 bps to match the average shadow rate in the ZLB period. Keeping everything else
the same, Figure 2.14 plots the variation of the difference in yield curves when the initial shock
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changes from negative 60 bps to negative 180 bps. A weaker economy skews the LSAP more
effective.
The definition of one unit shock
In the baseline model, I define that one unit of forward guidance shock will lower the
nominal shadow rate by 25 basis points and one unit of LSAP shock will lower the 10-year yield
by 5 basis points. Now I illustrate how our estimate of the initial aggregate demand shock affects
our main results. Figure 2.15 shows how the difference in yield curve varies when we define one
unit LSAP shock to change 10-year yield by 3 bps or by 7 bps. Figure 2.16 plots the separate
contribution of forward guidance and LSAP shocks. The main results change barely when we
use different definition of one unit of shock.
The forward guidance persistence
The persistence of forward guidance shock is set to be 0.65 in the baseline model. Figure
2.17 shows how the difference in yield curve varies when the persistence of forward guidance
shock increases from 0.6 to 0.7. Intuitively, a more persistent forward guidance shock is more
effective on the 10-year interest rate.
The forward guidance horizon
The baseline model assumes forward guidance is effective for 7 quarters. Figure 2.18
shows how the difference in yield curve varies when the horizon is 6 quarters or 8 quarters.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I show how to identify and estimate the forward guidance and large-scale
asset purchase component of every FOMC announcement between 2008 and 2015. Building
on earlier work by Gertler and Karadi (2013), the theoretical model shows that easing forward
guidance announcement lowers Treasury yields at all maturities, with a peak effect at a maturity
of about 20 months; in contrast, easing LSAP will increase the shortest-maturity Treasury yields
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because of the feedback of the interest rate rule and will lower medium-term and long-term
yields, with the peak effect on the longest maturities.
I match the responses of the yield curve to a linear combination of the two shocks
predicted by the model with the observed change in the yield curve in a high-frequency window
around each Federal Reserve announcement. In this way, I estimate a time series for each type
of unconventional monetary policy announcement and show that these series correspond closely
to narrative elements of the FOMC announcements.
With the estimates of the shock series, I study the persistence of the monetary policy
shocks on aggregate economy using the structural model. My approach circumvents the limi-
tations of the standard event-study methodology. Among the key announcement dates in QE
I program I find that forward guidance was more effective at inflation, while LSAP was more
important in influencing output.
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Figure 2.1. Estimated Size of Each Shock Type
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Figure 2.2. Crisis Experiment
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Figure 2.3. Effects of Forward Guidance and LSAP Shocks
62
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Yield Maturity in Years
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
a
n
n
u
a
liz
ed
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
Forward guidance
LSAP
Figure 2.4. Difference Between Fitted Yield Curves
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Figure 2.5. Estimated Effects on 10-year Treasury Yield
64
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
begining of QE1
QE1
QE extention QE2
mid-2013
Operation Twist
late 2014
mid-2015
threshold
Taper Tantrum
Not to Taper
ba
sis
 p
oi
nt
s
N
ov
 2
00
8
Fe
b 
20
09
Ju
n 
20
09
Se
p 
20
09
Ja
n 
20
10
Ap
r 2
01
0
Au
g 
20
10
N
ov
 2
01
0
M
ar
 2
01
1
Ju
l 2
01
1
O
ct
 2
01
1
Fe
b 
20
12
M
ay
 2
01
2
Se
p 
20
12
D
ec
 2
01
2
Ap
r 2
01
3
Ju
l 2
01
3
N
ov
 2
01
3
Fe
b 
20
14
Ju
n 
20
14
forward guidance
LSAP
Figure 2.6. Estimated Effects on 10-year Treasury Yield
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Figure 2.7. Estimated Effects on 11/25/2008
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Figure 2.8. Estimated Effects on 12/16/2008
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Figure 2.9. Estimated Effects on 01/28/2009
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Figure 2.10. Estimated Effects on 08/09/2011
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Figure 2.11. Estimated Effects on 09/21/2011
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Figure 2.12. Estimated Effects on 06/19/2013
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Figure 2.13. Estimated Effects on 12/18/2013
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Figure 2.14. Difference Between Fitted Yield Curves When Initial Condition Varies
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Figure 2.15. Difference Between Fitted Yield Curves When the Definition of One Unit Shock
Varies
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Figure 2.16. Estimated Effects on 10-year Treasury Yield When the Definition of One Unit
Shock Varies
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Figure 2.17. Difference Between Fitted Yield Curves When Forward Guidance Persistence
Varies
76
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Yield Maturity in Years
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
-0.15
a
n
n
u
a
liz
ed
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
Forward guidance baseline
Forward guidance short horizon
Forward guidance long horizon
LSAP baseline
Figure 2.18. Difference Between Fitted Yield Curves When Forward Guidance Horizon Varies
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Chapter 3
Monetary Policy and Household Balance
Sheet Heterogeneity
Abstract
Monetary policy interventions have distributional effects across the population depending
on the composition of the assets and liabilities of households. I provide empirical analysis using
household-level panel data and document the responses of households’ expenditure, saving and
labor market outcome to monetary policy by their balance sheet heterogeneity. When there is
an expansionary monetary policy shock, households with mortgage debt spend more, save less
and supply less labor intensively and extensively compared to the renters, while responses of
home-owners without mortgage are not significantly different. Within the homeowners, liquidity,
leverage ratio or household wealth alone cannot generate any heterogeneity in expenditure, saving
or labor. To explain the results, one needs consider the wealth level as well as the borrowing
constraint at the same time.
3.1 Introduction
Understanding the transmission channels of monetary policy is an important topic for
both policymakers and researchers. In this paper, I investigate how households with heteroge-
neous balance sheet composition would make their decisions in response to monetary policy
interventions, and to what extent and this affects the aggregate economy.
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I contribute towards existing literature in two ways: (i) by quantifying the response of
expenditure, asset allocation and labor market outcome to monetary policy shocks by hetero-
geneity in the composition of households balances sheet, and (ii) by examining which channels
can explain the heterogeneous responses. To do so, I provide empirical analysis using household-
level micro data, and document empirical stylized facts that can be used to evaluate different
theoretical channels of monetary policy transmission.
In theory, changes in interest rates can have both direct and indirect effects. In response
to interest rate cut, households save less or borrow more and increase their expenditure. This is
the direct effect. Indirect effects could come from the expansion in labor demand and thus in
labor income and also come from wealth effects.
This paper estimates the response of household’s decision to monetary policy shocks.
I identify monetary policy shocks using high-frequency data on Federal funds futures and
Eurodollar futures. I obtain longitudinal household level asset allocation and employment data
from Survey of Income and Program Participation (hereafter SIPP). I find that monetary policy
will affects the choice of asset allocation, while the homeowners with mortgages respond more
than renters and outright owners. Among homeowners with the same level of home equity,
households with the median Loan-to-Value ratio are more responsive than other groups. I also
find that expansionary and contractionary monetary policy have asymmetric effects, probably
through the refinancing channel.
There are four reasons why the household’s balance sheet composition is important for
monetary policy transmission. First, home equity, the largest asset in the homeowner’s balance
sheet(details are in section 3.2), can serve as the dual role of durable good and collateral for
borrowers along the lines of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Therefore, homeowners will respond
differently to monetary policy shocks compared to renters, who don’t have collaterals (Cloyne
et al. (2016)). Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 plot the home ownership over time and the percentage of
mortgage holders within homeowners over time. We can see from the figures that the composition
changed over time and so would the aggregate effects of monetary policy.
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Second, monetary policy could also affect through the refinancing and new borrowing de-
cisions. Iacoviello (2005), Kaplan and Violante (2014) and Kaplan et al. (2018) have highlighted
that the redistribution channel between borrowers and savers monetary policies. Wong (2018)
finds that young people’s consumption is more responsive to monetary policy, and this is driven
by homeowners who refinance or enter new loans, which is concentrated among younger people.
In my analysis I confirmed the life-cycle component and also found that the asset position still
plays a role after controlling the demographics.
Furthermore, as outlined in the literature, both housing net worth and the leverage ratio
have a sizable effect on consumption and employment. Mian and Sufi (2014) show that counties
with a larger decline in housing net worth experience a larger decline in non-tradable employment.
Mian et al. (2013) find poorer and more levered households have a significantly higher marginal
propensity to consume(MPC) out of housing wealth.
Finally, the short-term nominal interest rates were at zero between 2009 and 2015, and
long term nominal Treasury yields remained low in this period. This has affected U.S. households
and their financial portfolios, as they traditionally hold a certain portion of their financial assets
in the form of deposits and government bonds. The heterogeneity comes from the fact that richer
households tend to have a higher propensity to save than households at the lower end of the
income distribution (e.g. Dynan et al. (2004)).
My first contribution is to provide a novel set of empirical stylized evidence and to use
these to evaluate different theoretical channels of monetary transmission. Different from studies
using pesudo panels, e.g. Luetticke (2015) and Cloyne et al. (2016), my paper is the first to
empirically document heterogeneity in the portfolio response to monetary shocks and analyze its
implications for monetary policy in a household level panel data setting. I focus on a far broader
set of household-level variables, including mortgage payments, labor income, saving and labor
market status.
My second contribution is presenting another channel of heterogeneity. In their seminal
papers, Kaplan and Violante (2014) and Kaplan et al. (2018) treat home equity as one kind of
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illiquid asset and don’t distinguish the property value from the mortgage. However, I find that
among the households who have the same level of home equity, the ones associated with median
level of Loan-to-Value responds the most to the monetary policy. One possible reason is that
there exists a fixed rate of refinance cost as well as there exists a Loan-to-Value threshold for
refinancing. Therefore, only the households with the median Loan-to-Value will take advantage
on refinancing opportunity.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. I begin by describing the data sets in
Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, I describe the regression methodology and results. Section 3.4
concludes.
3.2 Data
The main data source of this paper is the Survey of Income and Program Participation.
The SIPP is a nationally representative sample of non-institutionalized individuals and the house-
holds in which they reside. It is a longitudinal survey designed specifically to provide accurate
and comprehensive information about the income and program participation of individuals and
households in the United States, and about the principal determinants of income and program
participation. The survey follows the same individuals for periods up to four years. Each
individual in the survey is assigned to one of four rotation groups and is interviewed once every
four months, in a staggered fashion, collecting information on income, assets, and demographics
for the duration of the panel.
The SIPP 1990, 1992, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels are used in the paper’s empirical
analysis. A panel starts in every 2 years or more and tracks thousands of households over a
period of two or three years, collecting information on income, assets, and demographics. The
sample is divided into four groups equally. Each group is interviewed in a different month over
four consecutive months about activities and characteristics over the previous four-month period.
Each group is then re-interviewed at four-month intervals.1 Besides the core questionnaire, extra
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questions about assets and liabilities are added once per year. For example, among the total 16
interviews, the 2008 panel has collected asset data three times.
I restrict attention to the households of either owning or renting a residence. Households
living in a mobile home or living in a government subsidized living quarters are excluded.
There are three main advantages of using SIPP data instead of other commonly used
datasets. The first advantage of the SIPP is its large sample size and detailed information about
household portfolio allocation. Second, not like other annually collected data, or even the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data which collects almost every two years, the SIPP data is
collected within certain periods of a year, for example, between May and August. This allows
the paper to look at the monetary policy in a short window. Finally, main advantage of SIPP over
the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), another principal sources of wealth data for the U.S.
population, is that SIPP is a panel data, which allows us to study household’s decision problem
while controlling the initial balance sheet position.
3.2.1 Household balance sheet
Table 3.1 is the balance sheet of a typical household. The assets of the households have
several sources: the real estate property, vehicle, financial asset, retirement account, private
business, and other assets. The debts is divided into secured debt and unsecured debt1, where
the secured debt is home mortgages, car loans, business debt, stock debt and debt on rental
properties, while the unsecured debt is store bills/credit cards debt, loans and other debt. The
SIPP survey defines total wealth as total asset minus total secured debt. Therefore, the total
wealth is equal to the sum of home equity, net equity in vehicles, interest earning assets, equity
in stocks and mutual funds, in retirement account, in private business, in other real estate and in
other assets, where, for example, home equity is equal to real estate property value subtracted by
home mortgages, net equity in vehicles is equal to car value minus car loans, etc. Figures 3.7,
1Property can serve as collateral for a loan, in which case the loan is called a secured debt. If the loan is based
on future income, it is an unsecured debt.
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3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 plot the time varying asset composition for the three different types of home
ownership.
Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 reports summary statistics for the cross-sectional sample. The
SIPP 2008 panel contains information on 37,755 unique households, of which 21,644 are
homeowners, whom we define as individuals with positive property value and positive home
equity. Of these households, 13,038 have positive mortgage. We exclude an additional 1,608
households whose reported total wealth is top 5% in the sample. An additional 1,503 households
whose interest earning bank account is top 5% in the sample, and 787 household whose stock
and mutual funds account is top 5% in them sample. These exclusions leave us with 33,858
households in our longitudinal analysis sample. Home tenure is defined as the number of years
living in the current house. All monetary values are in real 2000 dollars.2 Safe assets contains
bonds, checking accounts, and savings accounts. Liquid wealth is defined as the sum of safe
assets and stockholdings.
3.2.2 Household labor market outcome
Labor market related data and income data is observed monthly for each individual. An
employment status is assigned as follows. I classify the individual as employed if one reports
having a job and being either present or absent without salary, either on layoff or not. I classify
the individual as unemployed if one reports having no job, but looking for job actively or being
on layoff. Individual will be assigned out of the labor force if he reports having no job, not
actively looking and not being on layoff. Further, I assign to each employed worker the total
working hours, based on the first and second jobs. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 plot the unemployment
rate and labor market participation rate. The numbers are very similar to those released by
Bureau of Labor Statistics. For each household, I then calculate the average hours worked, the
percentage of employed workers and labor market participants.
2The CPI data we use to adjust nominal values is downloaded from FRED.
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3.2.3 Household expenditure
Unfortunately, the survey doesn’t ask the respondent’s consumption directly. However,
I can recover the annual expenditure flow using the net worth in two continuous years and the
income flows in between. To be specific, I can observe the household’s net worth at month t−12
and month t; at the same time I also know the monthly income for each of the months between
t−12 and t. Using simple accounting, the outflow between t−12 and t, which I define as the
expenditure of the household, is thus equal to the sum of old net worth in month t−12 and the
12-month income flow minus the new net worth.
3.2.4 Monetary policy surprises
The monetary policy instrument set consists of futures rates surprises on FOMC dates,
including the surprises in the current month’s fed funds futures (MP1), in the three month ahead
monthly fed funds futures (FF4), and in the six month, nine month and year ahead futures
on three month Eurodollar deposits (ED2, ED3, ED4). I turn the futures surprises on FOMC
days into daily surprises that are orthogonal to fundamentals according to Zhang (2018), and I
cumulate the shocks into an annual surprise. Figure 3.6 plots the monetary policy shock over
time.
3.3 Empirical methodology
The goal of the empirical analysis is to estimate the effect of a change in interest rate on
the household’s decision and test the importance of different heterogeneity.
3.3.1 Baseline specification
I first present the baseline specification where the effects of monetary policy is explored.
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yi,t =∑
j
η jyi,t− j+β1MPt
+σXi,t−12+ ταi+ γλi,t+σWlthDistrt−12+ constant+ εi,t (3.1)
In the regression equation, yi,t− j denotes the variables of interest for household i at month
t− j, such as the log of expenditure, the log of the holdings of safe assets, the average hours
worked per week, the percentage of the household that is employed or in the labor market force;
MPt is the cumulative monetary surprise happened between period t−12 and t; Xi,t−12 denotes
a vector of controls, including the log of residential property value and total wealth in month
t−12; αi is the time-invariant variables, such as gender of the household head, and λi,t is some
other control variables in month t, such as household income; WlthDistrt−12 represents the 10
quantiles from the population wealth distribution from t−12 to capture the effects of total wealth
distribution; the error term εi,t captures other sources of heterogeneity. 3
β1 describes the effects of monetary policy on the outcome variables. Table 3.5 shows the
regression result. Each column represents dependent variable being the log of the expenditure,
the log of the amount held as safe asset, the hours per week, employment rate and labor market
participation rate.4 Contractionary and expansionary monetary policies do have opposite effects
on the expenditure and labor market outcomes.
3To distinguish between the responses to expansionary shocks from the responses to contractionary shocks, I
test the following specificaiton:
yi,t =∑
j
η jyi,t− j+β1MP+t +β2MP
−
t
+σXi,t−12+ ταi+ γλi,t +σWlthDistrt−12+ constant+ εi,t
where MP+t and MP
−
t are the cumulative contractionary and expansionary monetary surprise happened between
period t−12 and t, defined as MP+t = max{∑11j=0mpst− j,0} and MP−t = min{∑11j=0mpst− j,0}(mpst is the monetary
policy shock in month t) respectively.
4I used the survey regression function (svy) in Stata to account for the clustering within the samples and
respondents and to generate population estimates using sample weights.
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3.3.2 Specification I: age
First, I revisit the age heterogeneity, which has been widely discussed in the previous
literature. One of the reasons that age plays an important role in the transmission channel is
because of the young people is more likely to be the borrowers.
yi,t =∑
j
η jyi,t− j+β1MPt
+β2Youngi,t+β3MiddleAgei,t
+β4MPt ∗Youngi,t+β5MPt ∗MiddleAgei,t
+σXi,t−12+ ταi+ γλi,t+ constant+ εi,t (3.2)
Youngi,t is a dummy variable indicating whether the household head of household i is
between age 25 and 35, and MiddleAge a dummy variable for household head between 35 and
64 years old; the omitted group is for 64 and above. As in the baseline, I have controlled the
household type (single, married, etc), race, education, number of total household members and
number of children and population wealth distribution.
The parameters of interest are β4 and β5. Table 3.6 shows the regression result. When
there’s contractionary monetary policy, the household on average will increase their safe asset.
However, compared to the old household, middle age household save 1.3 percent less, and young
household save 1.8 percent less than the old household. There’s no significant different among
the age groups for labor market outcome.
3.3.3 Specification II: homeownership
The second heterogeneity I look at is the homeownership. Homeowner differs from
renters by having their residence as collaterals for borrowing, while they face a higher cost to
liquid their housing asset. Another channel is that the mortgage holding homeowners could be
more sensitive to interest rate. I use the following specification:
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yi,t =∑
j
η jyi,t− j+β1MPt
+β2HOwDi,t−12+β3HOnDi,t−12
+β4MPt ∗HOwDi,t−12+β5MPt ∗HOnDi,t−12
+σXi,t−12+ ταi+ γλi,t+ constant+ εi,t (3.3)
HOwDi,t−12 is a dummy variable indicating whether the household i is homeowner
with debt in month t − 12, and HOnDi,t−12 a dummy variable for the homeowner without
mortgages. The omitted group is the renter. I also controlled the age heterogeneity by including
the interaction term between age dummies variables and the monetary policy shocks.
Table 3.7 shows that compared to renters, the household with mortgages expend more,
save less and supply less labor intensively and extensively to expansionary monetary policy.
3.3.4 Specification III: “wealthy” hand-to-mouth
In this section, I’m investigating the household liquidity constraint. I follow Kaplan and
Violante (2014) and define a household as hand-to-mouth if at any given point in time their net
liquid wealth is less than half of their total monthly labor income. I first investigate whether
being hand-to-mouth will respond different to monetary policies. The regression equation is:
yi,t =∑
j
η jyi,t− j+β1MPt+β2HtMi,t−12+β4MPt ∗HtMi,t−12
+σXi,t−12+ ταi+ γλi,t+ constant+ εi,t (3.4)
where HtMi,t−12 is a dummy variable to indicate whether household i in month t−12 is
hand-to-mouth or not. However, as shown in Table 3.8, whether the household facing liquidity
constraint or not doesn’t result in heterogeneous response.
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Kaplan and Violante (2014) define the hand-to-mouth households are ‘wealthy’ if they
have positive illiquid asset. Here I investigate the “wealthy” hand-to-mouth household and
furthermore distinguish them by renter, homeowner with debt, and homeowner without debt,
where the latter two groups both have positive asset.
yi,t =∑
j
η jyi,t− j+β1MPt ∗HtMi,t−12 ∗HOwDi,t−12+β2MPt ∗HtMi,t−12 ∗HOnDi,t−12
+β3HtMi,t−12 ∗HOwDi,t−12+β4HtMi,t−12 ∗HOnDi,t−12
+β5MPt ∗HOwDi,t−12+β6MPt ∗HOnDi,t−12
+σXi,t−12+ ταi+ γλi,t+ constant+ εi,t (3.5)
Table 3.9 shows homeowner with debt spend less than the homeowner without debt in
response to expansionary montary policy shock.
3.3.5 Specification IV: home equity
In this section, I investigate the household indebtedness. I focus on homeowners and use
home equity as a measure of indebtedness. The specification is as follows:
yi,t =∑
j
η jyi,t− j+β1MPt+β2ln(HEQi,t−12)+β3MPt ∗ ln(HEQi,t−12)
+σXi,t−12+ ταi+ γλi,t+ constant+other controll variables+ εi,t (3.6)
where ln(HEQi,t−12)i,t−12 is log of thei in month t−12, which could be either the log
of home equity or net worth. β3 describes how the heterogeneous balance sheet position of the
household could affect the portfolio/labor allocation decision when there is monetary policy
announcement. Most of the coefficients are insignificant from zero as shown in Table 3.10.
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3.3.6 Specification V: Loan to Value ratio
In this section, I restrict the sample to be homeowners with mortgages and investigat the
household’s housing leverage ratio. I measure the loan to value (LTV) of the house as the total
mortgage divided by the property value. I group the mortgage holders into 4 quantile groups
based on their LTV ratios. The specification I’m using is as follows:
yi,t =β1MPt ∗LTVq2i,t−12+β2MPt ∗LTVq3i,t−12+β3MPt ∗LTVq4i,t−12
+σXi,t−12+ ταi+ γλi,t+ constant+other controll variables+ εi,t (3.7)
However, most of the coefficients are insignificant from zero as shown in Table 3.11.
3.3.7 Specification VI: home equity and Loan to Value ratio
Chetty et al. (2017) show that characterizing the effects of housing on portfolios requires
distinguishing between the effects of home equity and mortgage debt. In this section, I separate
home equity and the leverage ratio. The specification I’m using is as follows:
yi,t =∑
j
η jyi,t− j+β1MP∗ ln(HEQi,t−12)∗LTVi,t−12
+σXi,t−12+ ταi+ γλi,t+ constant+other controll variables+ εi,t (3.8)
Table 3.12 shows the regression result. The difference in leverage ratio can explain the
heterogenous response of labor market outcome.
3.4 Conclusion
Assessing the empirical effects of changes in monetary policy is very important for
distinguishing between different macro models and frictions in the economy. In this paper, I
provide empirical analysis using household-level micro data and document the responses of
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households’ expenditure, saving and labor market outcome to monetary policy by their balance
sheet heterogeneity.
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Figure 3.1. Ratio of Homeowner without Debt in the Population
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Figure 3.2. Ratio of Mortgage Holder in the Population
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Figure 3.3. Ratio of Renter in the Population
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Figure 3.4. Unemployment Ratio in the Population
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Figure 3.5. Labor Force Participation Ratio in the Population
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Figure 3.6. Cumulative Monetary Policy Shock
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Figure 3.7. 25th Quantile Asset Composition Over Time by Housing Status
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Figure 3.8. Median Quantile Asset Composition Over Time by Housing Status
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Figure 3.9. 75th Quantile Asset Composition Over Time by Housing Status
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Figure 3.10. 90th Quantile Asset Composition Over Time by Housing Status
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Table 3.1. Household Balance Sheet
Total Wealth Debts
Home equity Amount owed for loans
Net equity in vehicles Amount owed for store bills or credit cards
Equity in stocks and mutual fund shares Amount owed for other debt
Interest earning assets held in banking Net Worth
Interest earning assets held in other
Equity in other assets
Equity in IRA and KEOGH accounts
Equity in 401K and Thrift savings accounts
Business equity
Equity on other real estate
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Table 3.2. Summary Statistics for SIPP Cross-sectional Homeowner with Debt
(1)
mean sd p25 p50 p75
age 46 12 37 45 54
education 14 3 12 13 16
number of kids 0.74 1.05 0.00 0.00 1.00
totoal income 5,342 4,348 2,791 4,408 6,605
property value 145,893 123,408 66,395 116,044 193,552
mortgage 76,838 66,629 26,875 62,790 108,587
home tenure 9.74 8.97 3.00 7.00 14.00
total wealth 179,525 874,821 31,367 83,394 205,208
liquid asset 42,150 884,784 106 3,002 19,317
home equity 69,055 86,363 11,819 39,681 92,105
equity in other real estate 15,511 77,342 0 0 0
equity in vehicle 6,886 8,795 1,500 5,489 10,825
business equity 13,157 98,362 0 0 0
retirement account 30,159 67,411 0 132 26,254
percent of households holding stock 0.21 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.33
stock share (% of liquid wealth) 0.22 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.40
safe assets share 0.78 0.36 0.60 1.00 1.00
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Table 3.3. Summary Statistics for SIPP Cross-sectional Homeowner without Debt
(1)
mean sd p25 p50 p75
age 64 15 54 66 75
education 12 3 12 12 13
number of kids 0.21 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00
totoal income 3,086 3,297 1,233 2,237 3,862
property value 109,524 112,330 36,091 79,198 144,900
mortgage 0 0 0 0 0
home tenure 24.61 16.13 11.00 24.00 36.00
total wealth 244,562 1,107,576 59,057 130,422 280,098
liquid asset 69,465 1,126,262 0 4,446 41,299
home equity 109,524 112,330 36,091 79,198 144,900
equity in other real estate 18,189 85,755 0 0 0
equity in vehicle 7,092 8,564 1,116 4,926 10,571
business equity 10,114 88,040 0 0 0
retirement account 25,873 66,407 0 0 15,752
percent of households holding stock 0.20 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00
stock share (% of liquid wealth) 0.21 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.33
safe assets share 0.79 0.34 0.67 1.00 1.00
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Table 3.4. Summary Statistics for SIPP Cross-sectional Private Renter
(1)
mean sd p25 p50 p75
age 42 16 29 38 50
education 13 3 12 12 14
number of kids 0.60 1.02 0.00 0.00 1.00
totoal income 2,777 2,606 1,217 2,200 3,590
property value 0 0 0 0 0
mortgage 0 0 0 0 0
home tenure . . . . .
total wealth 28,781 397,316 651 4,453 14,429
liquid asset 11,803 407,277 0 20 1,826
home equity 176 4,835 0 0 0
equity in other real estate 2,612 26,428 0 0 0
equity in vehicle 2,857 5,184 0 1,500 4,848
business equity 3,880 49,164 0 0 0
retirement account 5,894 26,214 0 0 0
percent of households holding stock 0.08 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
stock share (% of liquid wealth) 0.12 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
safe assets share 0.88 0.29 1.00 1.00 1.00
112
Ta
bl
e
3.
5.
B
as
el
in
e
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
ln
(e
xp
en
di
tu
re
)
ln
(s
af
e
as
se
t)
la
bo
rh
ou
rs
la
bo
re
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
la
bo
rp
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n
M
P
0.
10
9∗
∗
0.
27
8∗
∗∗
0.
00
4
0.
00
3
-0
.0
01
(2
.5
5)
(2
.9
2)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.5
0)
(-
0.
25
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
10
38
64
81
71
6
88
00
4
12
60
50
12
60
50
ts
ta
tis
tic
s
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
∗
p
<
0.
10
,∗
∗
p
<
0.
05
,∗
∗∗
p
<
0.
01
113
Ta
bl
e
3.
6.
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
I,
A
ge
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
ln
(e
xp
en
di
tu
re
)
ln
(s
af
e
as
se
t)
la
bo
rh
ou
rs
la
bo
re
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
la
bo
rp
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n
m
ai
n
M
P
-0
.0
63
0.
21
6
-0
.3
24
0.
00
3
0.
00
1
(-
0.
79
)
(1
.2
2)
(-
0.
28
)
(0
.3
4)
(0
.1
5)
Y
ou
ng
-0
.1
43
∗∗
∗
-0
.8
17
∗∗
∗
3.
36
8∗
∗∗
0.
06
5∗
∗∗
0.
05
4∗
∗∗
(-
10
.3
4)
(-
30
.1
1)
(1
8.
71
)
(2
6.
77
)
(2
5.
65
)
M
id
dl
eA
ge
-0
.0
85
∗∗
∗
-0
.5
70
∗∗
∗
3.
07
2∗
∗∗
0.
05
3∗
∗∗
0.
04
5∗
∗∗
(-
7.
13
)
(-
32
.0
9)
(2
1.
52
)
(2
8.
42
)
(2
5.
71
)
M
P*
Y
ou
ng
0.
24
7∗
∗∗
0.
42
6
-0
.0
89
-0
.0
24
-0
.0
24
∗
(2
.7
2)
(1
.6
4)
(-
0.
06
)
(-
1.
38
)
(-
1.
71
)
M
P*
M
id
dl
eA
ge
0.
21
7∗
∗
0.
01
0
0.
48
2
0.
00
7
0.
00
2
(2
.5
8)
(0
.0
6)
(0
.4
1)
(0
.6
8)
(0
.2
1)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
10
38
64
81
71
6
88
00
4
12
60
50
12
60
50
ts
ta
tis
tic
s
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
∗
p
<
0.
10
,∗
∗
p
<
0.
05
,∗
∗∗
p
<
0.
01
114
Ta
bl
e
3.
7.
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
II
,H
om
eo
w
ne
rs
hi
p
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
ln
(e
xp
en
di
tu
re
)
ln
(s
af
e
as
se
t)
la
bo
rh
ou
rs
la
bo
re
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
la
bo
rp
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n
m
ai
n
M
P
*
H
O
w
/d
eb
t
t-
12
0.
15
1∗
∗
-0
.4
07
∗
-0
.6
72
-0
.0
28
∗∗
-0
.0
29
∗∗
(2
.1
5)
(-
1.
91
)
(-
0.
69
)
(-
2.
03
)
(-
2.
10
)
M
P*
H
O
w
/o
de
bt
t-
12
0.
02
5
-0
.0
15
-0
.4
24
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
03
(0
.2
8)
(-
0.
06
)
(-
0.
32
)
(-
0.
32
)
(-
0.
16
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
10
38
64
81
71
6
88
00
4
12
60
50
12
60
50
ts
ta
tis
tic
s
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
∗
p
<
0.
10
,∗
∗
p
<
0.
05
,∗
∗∗
p
<
0.
01
115
Ta
bl
e
3.
8.
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
II
I(
i)
,H
an
d
to
M
ou
th
H
ou
se
ho
ld
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
ln
(e
xp
en
di
tu
re
)
ln
(s
af
e
as
se
t)
la
bo
rh
ou
rs
la
bo
re
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
la
bo
rp
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n
M
P
-0
.0
68
0.
21
0
-0
.4
88
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
01
(-
0.
79
)
(1
.1
9)
(-
0.
42
)
(-
0.
06
)
(-
0.
14
)
H
tM
t-
12
-0
.1
55
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
08
∗∗
∗
0.
11
3
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
(-
19
.1
5)
(-
9.
62
)
(1
.5
6)
(0
.7
0)
(1
.2
6)
M
P*
H
tM
t-
12
-0
.0
07
0.
01
3
0.
50
5
0.
01
1
0.
00
7
(-
0.
10
)
(0
.0
8)
(0
.6
6)
(0
.9
8)
(0
.7
6)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
10
38
64
81
71
6
88
00
4
12
60
50
12
60
50
ts
ta
tis
tic
s
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
∗
p
<
0.
10
,∗
∗
p
<
0.
05
,∗
∗∗
p
<
0.
01
116
Ta
bl
e
3.
9.
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
II
I(
ii)
,“
W
ea
lth
y”
H
an
d
to
M
ou
th
H
ou
se
ho
ld
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
ln
(e
xp
en
di
tu
re
)
ln
(s
af
e
as
se
t)
la
bo
rh
ou
rs
la
bo
re
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
la
bo
rp
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n
M
P*
H
O
w
/d
eb
t
t-
12
-2
.8
00
∗∗
∗
1.
09
6
13
.3
77
-0
.2
74
∗∗
-0
.2
22
∗
(-
3.
45
)
(0
.5
5)
(1
.1
8)
(-
2.
22
)
(-
1.
69
)
M
P*
ln
(H
om
eE
qu
ity
)
t-
12
-0
.1
28
∗
0.
13
6
1.
20
4
-0
.0
21
∗∗
-0
.0
12
(-
1.
92
)
(0
.9
4)
(1
.3
7)
(-
2.
31
)
(-
1.
30
)
M
P*
ln
(H
om
eE
qu
ity
)*
H
O
w
/d
eb
t
t-
12
0.
27
0∗
∗∗
-0
.1
23
-1
.2
19
0.
02
3∗
∗
0.
01
8
(3
.6
0)
(-
0.
71
)
(-
1.
19
)
(2
.0
8)
(1
.5
4)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
76
94
9
68
63
4
66
60
1
97
12
2
97
12
2
ts
ta
tis
tic
s
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
∗
p
<
0.
10
,∗
∗
p
<
0.
05
,∗
∗∗
p
<
0.
01
117
Ta
bl
e
3.
10
.S
pe
ci
fic
at
io
n
IV
,H
om
e
E
qu
ity
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
sa
fe
as
se
t
la
bo
rh
ou
rs
la
bo
re
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
la
bo
rp
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n
M
P
-0
.5
51
-0
.3
88
-5
.7
28
0.
06
3
0.
00
1
(-
1.
34
)
(-
0.
44
)
(-
1.
12
)
(1
.0
3)
(0
.0
2)
ln
(H
E
Q
)
t-
12
-0
.0
78
∗∗
∗
0.
01
9
-0
.1
77
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
01
(-
10
.4
3)
(1
.4
1)
(-
2.
94
)
(-
1.
39
)
(-
1.
04
)
M
P*
ln
(H
om
eE
qu
ity
)
t-
12
0.
04
5
0.
05
1
0.
38
9
-0
.0
05
0.
00
0
(1
.2
0)
(0
.7
1)
(0
.9
2)
(-
1.
01
)
(0
.0
2)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
76
55
7
68
44
2
66
22
6
96
72
3
96
72
3
ts
ta
tis
tic
s
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
∗
p
<
0.
10
,∗
∗
p
<
0.
05
,∗
∗∗
p
<
0.
01
118
Ta
bl
e
3.
11
.S
pe
ci
fic
at
io
n
V,
L
oa
n
to
V
al
ue
R
at
io
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
sa
fe
as
se
t
la
bo
rh
ou
rs
la
bo
re
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
la
bo
rp
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n
M
P*
LT
V
q2
5
t-
12
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
21
1.
30
1
-0
.0
41
∗∗
-0
.0
34
∗
(-
0.
03
)
(-
0.
08
)
(0
.9
3)
(-
2.
22
)
(-
1.
86
)
M
P*
LT
V
q5
0
t-
12
-0
.0
13
0.
05
7
1.
89
4
-0
.0
30
∗
-0
.0
48
∗∗
∗
(-
0.
08
)
(0
.2
0)
(1
.2
8)
(-
1.
71
)
(-
2.
76
)
M
P*
LT
V
q7
5
t-
12
-0
.1
64
0.
18
9
-0
.3
78
-0
.0
29
-0
.0
32
∗
(-
1.
07
)
(0
.6
8)
(-
0.
23
)
(-
1.
43
)
(-
1.
73
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
49
08
1
42
52
9
51
94
5
57
77
7
57
77
7
ts
ta
tis
tic
s
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
∗
p
<
0.
10
,∗
∗
p
<
0.
05
,∗
∗∗
p
<
0.
01
119
Ta
bl
e
3.
12
.S
pe
ci
fic
at
io
n
V
I,
H
om
e
E
qu
ity
an
d
LT
V
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
sa
fe
as
se
t
la
bo
rh
ou
rs
la
bo
re
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
la
bo
rp
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n
M
P*
ln
(H
om
eE
qu
ity
)*
LT
V
q2
5
t-
12
0.
07
8
-0
.6
13
-1
.3
19
0.
00
3
0.
00
8
(0
.3
4)
(-
1.
51
)
(-
0.
61
)
(0
.0
8)
(0
.2
8)
M
P*
ln
(H
om
eE
qu
ity
)*
LT
V
q5
0
t-
12
-0
.0
08
0.
13
1
-0
.4
40
0.
07
6∗
∗
0.
06
8∗
∗
(-
0.
03
)
(0
.2
7)
(-
0.
18
)
(2
.4
8)
(2
.2
8)
M
P*
ln
(H
om
eE
qu
ity
)*
LT
V
q7
5
t-
12
-0
.2
97
-0
.0
17
-0
.7
56
0.
02
6
0.
02
4
(-
1.
36
)
(-
0.
04
)
(-
0.
39
)
(0
.7
7)
(0
.7
8)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
38
15
2
33
61
5
40
57
5
45
15
7
45
15
7
ts
ta
tis
tic
s
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
∗
p
<
0.
10
,∗
∗
p
<
0.
05
,∗
∗∗
p
<
0.
01
120
Bibliography
Arellano, C. and A. Ramanarayanan (2012). Default and the maturity structure in sovereign
bonds. Journal of Political Economy 120(2), 187–232.
Bauer, M. D. and G. D. Rudebusch (2014). The signaling channel for federal reserve bond
purchases. International Journal of Central Banking.
Baumeister, C. and L. Benati (2013). Unconventional monetary policy and the great recession-
estimating the impact of a compression in the yield spread at the zero lower bound. Technical
report.
Best, G. and P. Kapinos (2016). Monetary policy and news shocks: are taylor rules forward-
looking? The BE Journal of Macroeconomics 16(2), 335–360.
Bhattarai, S., G. B. Eggertsson, and B. Gafarov (2015). Time consistency and the duration
of government debt: A signalling theory of quantitative easing. Technical report, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Bundick, B. and A. L. Smith (2016). The dynamic effects of forward guidance shocks. Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City Working Paper (16-02).
Calvo, G. A. (1983). Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework. Journal of monetary
Economics 12(3), 383–398.
Campbell, J. R., C. L. Evans, J. D. Fisher, and A. Justiniano (2012). Macroeconomic effects of
federal reserve forward guidance. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2012(1), 1–80.
Chen, H., V. Cu´rdia, and A. Ferrero (2012). The macroeconomic effects of large-scale asset
purchase programmes. The Economic Journal 122(564), F289–F315.
Chetty, R., L. Sa´ndor, and A. Szeidl (2017). The effect of housing on portfolio choice. The
Journal of Finance 72(3), 1171–1212.
Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum, and C. L. Evans (2005). Nominal rigidities and the dynamic
effects of a shock to monetary policy. Journal of political Economy 113(1), 1–45.
121
Chung, H., J.-P. Laforte, D. Reifschneider, and J. C. Williams (2012). Have we underestimated
the likelihood and severity of zero lower bound events? Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking 44(s1), 47–82.
Cieslak, A. and A. Schrimpf (2018). Non-monetary news in central bank communication.
Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cloyne, J., C. Ferreira, and P. Surico (2016). Monetary policy when households have debt: new
evidence on the transmission mechanism.
Coibion, O., Y. Gorodnichenko, and J. Wieland (2012). The optimal inflation rate in new
keynesian models: should central banks raise their inflation targets in light of the zero lower
bound? The Review of Economic Studies, rds013.
Del Negro, M., M. P. Giannoni, and C. Patterson (2015). The forward guidance puzzle. FRB of
New York Staff Report (574).
Del Negro, M. and F. Schorfheide (2008). Forming priors for dsge models (and how it affects
the assessment of nominal rigidities). Journal of Monetary Economics 55(7), 1191–1208.
Dynan, K. E., J. Skinner, and S. P. Zeldes (2004). Do the rich save more? Journal of political
economy 112(2), 397–444.
Eggertsson, G. B. et al. (2003). Zero bound on interest rates and optimal monetary policy.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2003(1), 139–233.
Gagnon, J., M. Raskin, J. Remache, and B. Sack (2011). Large-scale asset purchases by the
federal reserve: Did they work? Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review,
41.
Gertler, M. and P. Karadi (2011). A model of unconventional monetary policy. Journal of
monetary Economics 58(1), 17–34.
Gertler, M. and P. Karadi (2013). Qe 1 vs. 2 vs. 3...: A framework for analyzing large-scale asset
purchases as a monetary policy tool. international Journal of central Banking 9(1), 5–53.
Gertler, M. and P. Karadi (2015). Monetary policy surprises, credit costs, and economic activity.
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 7(1), 44–76.
Gilchrist, S. and E. Zakrajsˇek (2013). The impact of the federal reserve’s large-scale asset
purchase programs on corporate credit risk. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 45(s2),
29–57.
Guerrieri, L. and M. Iacoviello (2015). Occbin: A toolkit for solving dynamic models with
122
occasionally binding constraints easily. Journal of Monetary Economics 70, 22–38.
Gu¨rkaynak, R. S., B. Sack, and E. T. Swansonc (2005). Do actions speak louder than words? the
response of asset prices to monetary policy actions and statements. International Journal of
Central Banking.
Gu¨rkaynak, R. S., B. Sack, and J. H. Wright (2007). The us treasury yield curve: 1961 to the
present. Journal of Monetary Economics 54(8), 2291–2304.
Gu¨rkaynak, R. S., B. Sack, and J. H. Wright (2010). The tips yield curve and inflation compen-
sation. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 70–92.
Hamilton, J. (2018, September). The efficacy of large-scale asset purchases when the short-term
interest rate is at its effective lower bound. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.
Iacoviello, M. (2005). House prices, borrowing constraints, and monetary policy in the business
cycle. American economic review 95(3), 739–764.
Jarocin´ski, M. and P. Karadi (2018). Deconstructing monetary policy surprises: the role of
information shocks.
Kaplan, G., B. Moll, and G. L. Violante (2018). Monetary policy according to hank. American
Economic Review 108(3), 697–743.
Kaplan, G. and G. L. Violante (2014). A model of the consumption response to fiscal stimulus
payments. Econometrica 82(4), 1199–1239.
Keen, B. D., A. W. Richter, and N. A. Throckmorton (2016). Forward guidance and the state of
the economy. Working Paper.
Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore (1997). Credit cycles. Journal of political economy 105(2), 211–248.
Krippner, L. (2016). Documentation for measures of monetary policy. Reserve Bank of New
Zealand Working Paper.
Krishnamurthy, A., A. Vissing-Jorgensen, S. Gilchrist, and T. Philippon (2011). The effects of
quantitative easing on interest rates: Channels and implications for policy [with comments
and discussion]. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 215–287.
Kuttner, K. N. (2001). Monetary policy surprises and interest rates: Evidence from the fed funds
futures market. Journal of monetary economics 47(3), 523–544.
Lase´en, S. and L. E. Svensson (2011). Anticipated alternative policy rate paths in policy
simulations. The International Journal of Central Banking 7(3), 1–35.
123
Luetticke, R. (2015). Transmission of monetary policy with heterogeneity in household portfolios.
University of Bonn Work in Progress.
McKay, A., E. Nakamura, and J. Steinsson (2015). The power of forward guidance revisited.
Technical report.
Mian, A., K. Rao, and A. Sufi (2013). Household balance sheets, consumption, and the economic
slump. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(4), 1687–1726.
Mian, A. and A. Sufi (2014). What explains the 2007–2009 drop in employment? Economet-
rica 82(6), 2197–2223.
Miranda-Agrippino, S. and G. Ricco (2018). The transmission of monetary policy shocks.
Working Paper.
Montiel Olea, J., J. Stock, and M. W. Watson (2018). Inference in structural vars with external
instruments. Harvard University.
Nakamura, E. and J. Steinsson (2018). High frequency identification of monetary non-neutrality:
The information effect. Forthcoming, Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Nelson, C. R. and A. F. Siegel (1987). Parsimonious modeling of yield curves. The Journal of
Business 60(4), 473–489.
Romer, C. D. and D. H. Romer (2004). A new measure of monetary shocks: Derivation and
implications. American Economic Review 94(4), 1055–1084.
Stock, J. H. and M. W. Watson (2002). Macroeconomic forecasting using diffusion indexes.
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 20(2), 147–162.
Swanson, E. T. (2017). Measuring the effects of unconventional monetary policy on asset prices.
Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Swanson, E. T. and J. C. Williams (2014). Measuring the effect of the zero lower bound on
medium-and longer-term interest rates. The American Economic Review 104(10), 3154–3185.
Wieland, J. F. and M.-J. Yang (2016). Financial dampening. Technical report, National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Wong, A. (2018). Population aging and the transmission of monetary policy to consumption.
Working Paper.
Woodford, M. (2001). Fiscal requirements for price stability. Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking 33(3), 669.
124
Wright, J. H. (2012). What does monetary policy do to long-term interest rates at the zero lower
bound? The Economic Journal 122(564).
Wu, J. C. and F. D. Xia (2016). Measuring the macroeconomic impact of monetary policy at the
zero lower bound. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 48(2-3), 253–291.
Wu, T. (2014). Unconventional monetary policy and long-term interest rates. Number 14-189.
International Monetary Fund.
Zhang, X. (2018). Disentangling the information effects in the federal reserve’s monetary policy
announcements. Working Paper.
125
